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Abstract
A common misconception is that Latin America is one homogeneous market. In reality each
Latin American country has unique characteristics with sectors that collectively span much of the
risk/reward spectrum. For example, Mexico is perceived to be highly correlated with the United
States while Argentina and Brazil seem less so. On the other hand, the interrelation between
these economies is also significant. Economic crises in Mexico, Brazil, and most recently
Argentina have had important effects throughout the region.
Many real estate investors simply view Latin America as a land of economic trouble. Yet
several outsiders are starting or continuing to seek investment opportunities in the region. The
purpose of this thesis is to analyze and compare, from the viewpoint of a foreign investor, three
major real estate markets in the region: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The paper will attempt to
explain how the real estate "game" is played in each country, what the specific risks are for the
foreign investor, and how investors are currently seeking to maximize risk-adjusted returns in
these markets.
Thesis Advisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Professor of Economics
2
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank to our respective fianc6s for their support and understanding throughout
the project in the past school year. Their support and advice made the difficult times seem
bearable.
We would like also to thank Professor Wheaton for his guidance during our research.
Finally, our special recognition goes to LaSalle Investment Management and particularly Jacques
Gordon, International Director - Investment Strategy, for sponsoring the project. Jones Lang
LaSalle, through their offices in Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Mexico DF and Monterrey, provided
valuable operational support, market data and contacts.
3
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................... 6
2 REGIONAL OVERVIEW ........................................ 9
2. 1 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ................................... 10.........
2.2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE ................................... 13...........
2.3 CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................... 16
3 MARKET COMPARISONS ...................................................................................... 21
3.1 BASIC COUNTRY FACTS ................................... 22
3.2 DEMOGRAPHICS AND DOMESTIC WEALTH ......... 22
3.3 POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND CLIMATE ...................... 24
3.4 ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND FORECASTS .26
3.5 REAL ESTATE MARKET FUNDAMENTALS ................... 3...................7.................
3.6 REAL ESTATE STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ..... ........................................ 37
4 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN REAL ESTATE ............. 50
4.1 THE FOREIGN RISK PREMIUM ................................. 5...................1......
4.2 RISKS FOR THE FOREIGN INVESTOR ................................................................................. 57
4.3 STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING RISK .................. ......... ............................. 65
4.4 INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND RECENT ACTIVITY ................................... 70
4.5 OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FOREIGN INVESTOR . ................................... 81
4.6 INVESTMENT "EXITS ................................... 84.........
5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 89
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................... 91
4
Tables
TABLE 2.1: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ................................ ................................................ 10
TABLE 2.2: TRADE PARTNERS ......... . ...................................................................................... 14
TABLE 3.1: EIU FORECASTS ......... .................... ..................................................................... 36
TABLE 4.1: COUNTRY RISK PREMIUMS ....................................................................................... 56
Fiures
FIGURE 2.1: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ......... ............. ..................... ............................ 1
FIGURE 3.1: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT ........................................................................................ 27
FIGURE 3.2: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ................................................................................... 28
FIGURE 3.3 ARGENTINE STOCK MARKET .................................................................................... 29
FIGURE 3.4: ARGENTINE CURRENCY .......................................................................................... 30
FIGURE 3.5: BRAZILIAN STOCK MARKET .................................................................................... 31
FIGURE 3.6: BRAZILIAN CURRENCY ......... ... ............................................................................. 32
FIGURE 3.7: MEXICAN CURRENCY ............................................................................................. 34
FIGURE 3.8: M EXICAN STOCK MARKET .......... . ........................................................................ 35
FIGURE 3.9: SELF-FINANCING SCHEMES ..................................................................................... 43
FIGURE 3.10: SELF-FINANCING SCHEMES (CONT.) ...................................................................... 44
FIGURE 3.11: FIDEICOMISOS ...................................................................................................... 47
FIGURE 4.1: RISK PREMIUMS ..................................................................................................... 53
FIGURE 4.2: EFFECTS OF DEVALUATION: NOMINAL AND REAL ................................................... 64
5
I INTRODUCTION
A common misconception is that Latin America is one homogeneous market. In reality each
Latin American country has unique characteristics with sectors that collectively span much of the
risk/reward spectrum. For example, Mexico is perceived to be highly correlated with the United
States while Argentina and Brazil seem less so.
On the other hand, the interrelation between these economies is also significant. Mexico, Brazil,
and most recently Argentina have experienced economic crises with far reaching effects. In
December 1994, the devaluation of the Mexican peso provoked a sell-off of bonds throughout
the region. In January 1999, the devaluation of the Brazilian Real was a major blow to
Argentina's exports as well as the incomes of Argentine real estate companies with Brazilian
interests (i.e. IRSA). Currently, Argentina is suffering from a three year recession, a growing
budget deficit, and political uncertainty. The effects of a default on its foreign debt could have a
disproportionate impact on global markets because its debt makes up about one-fifth of the
supply of widely traded emerging-market bonds'. "Although Mexico is a safer haven for
investors, it can't be fully insulated from what's happening in Argentina," said Thierry Wizman,
global emerging markets strategist at Bear Stearns2. As evidenced by the effects on US capital
markets of Russia's 1998 default, it is perceivable that a default by Argentina could have far
reaching affects. Capital markets are now "truly global - inextricably linked and interrelated," as
mentioned by Ric Lewis of Curzon Global Partners.37
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Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2001
2 Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2001
Many investors see Latin America as a sea of economic trouble. Yet several outsiders are
starting or continuing to seek investment opportunities in the region. The purpose of this thesis
is to analyze and compare, from the viewpoint of a foreign investor, three major markets in this
region: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The paper will attempt to explain how the real estate
"game" is played in each country, what the specific risks are for the foreign investor, and how
investors are currently seeking to maximize risk-adjusted returns in these markets.
This thesis describes the real estate markets in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico both from the
perspective of the local environment and the potential for direct foreign investment. As this is a
very broad topic, we have generally chosen to focus on distinct areas: commercial real estate (as
opposed to the housing sector), major cities (rather than smaller nodes of activity), and foreign
investors (as opposed to local groups). We have carried out our research in part through
interviews with the major participants in each market.
Brief Outline:
Chapter 2 presents the regional background necessary for understanding each market. The topics
covered include foreign direct investment in the region as a whole, as well as the status of
international trade between the region and its major trading partners. Also covered are the
cultural considerations that affect the way the real estate industry functions in these markets.
The third chapter is then a top down analysis of each country from basic facts, demographics,
political structures and economic indicators, to structural and legal issues that relate to real
estate.
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Chapter 4 outlines some current thinking on international real estate investment, specifically the
foreign risk premium. The chapter then outlines the specific risks for the foreign investor as well
as the strategies they use for minimizing risk. The section also presents the strategies of the
major foreign investment players in the region. Finally, the chapter outlines the current
opportunities for the foreign investor in this market and maps out the investor's "exits" that are
currently available.
The last chapter summarizes the key issues described in the previous chapters.
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2 REGIONAL OVERVIEW
In the early 1990's foreign investment increased dramatically in the region, attracted by
significant liberalization efforts, which included the privatization of major government owned
industries, reduction of trade and investment barriers, modernization of the legal and regulatory
environment, and fiscal policies aimed at reducing inflation. During the same period, investment
in the real estate by foreign players followed the total foreign direct investment (FDI) volumes.
For example, international developers followed multinational companies, such as Bell and Coca-
Cola, as they expanded operations to the region.
By the mid-90's Mexico, Argentina and later Brazil, had stabilized their levels of inflation and
seemed to attain a macroeconomic level of stability. However, they were incapable of avoiding
corruptive practices and reducing unemployment as they all relied heavily on internal
consumption. Furthermore, emerging market crises in the mid to late 1990s significantly
changed capital flows to the region.
Latin America is facing in 2001 a more uncomfortable scenario due in part to the slowdown of
the US and its effect on the global economy. This general slowdown has tapered foreign
investment, exacerbated the internal problems and raised the perception of risk of each country.
The same is affecting both the flow of exports and the possibility for these countries to locate
affordable sources of capital. The effects on the real estate markets will be discussed in the
Chapters to follow.
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2.1 Foreign Direct Investment
The slowdown in these economies has brought together a slowdown in foreign direct investment
(FDI). Until 1990 the region attracted relatively modest foreign investment because of its
historical economic and political instability. The region saw an emergence in FDI to a peak of
nearly $77 billion in 1999 (see Table 2.1).
The net FDI for the region is estimated at $57 billion for year 2000. FDI in Latin America and
the Caribbean dropped by 20% from the previous year's figure of $77 billion, the first decrease
of the decade (see Figure 2.1). As the UN Comisi6n Econ6mica para America Latina y el Caribe
(CEPAL) points out, several of the large inflows recorded for 1999 were the result of a limited
number of major acquisitions of Latin American companies by foreign corporations (for
example: YPF in Argentina by Repsol and Endesa in Chile).3 In addition, close to 60% of total
foreign capital inflows was concentrated in just two countries: Brazil and Mexico. Brazil was
the leader in year 2000, accounting for 40% of total FDI inflows to Latin America. FDI flows
were generally used for the acquisition of existing assets, primarily in services sectors
(telecommunications, energy and finance).
Table 2.1: Foreign Direct Investment
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Latin America 11,066 12,506 10,363 23,706 24,799 39,387 55,580 61,596 77,047 57,410
Argentina 2,439 3,218 2,059 2,480 3,756 4,937 4,924 4,175 21,958 5,000
Brazil 89 1,924 801 2,035 3,475 11,666 18,608 29,192 28,612 30,000
Mexico 4,742 4,393 4,289 10,973 9,526 9,186 12,830 11,311 11,568 13,500
Source: Preliminary Overview of Latin America and the Caribbean, 18th April 2001, ECLAC, United Nations 4
3 Comisi6n Econ6mica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL): La inversi6n extranjera en America Latina y el
Caribe Informe 2000, April 2001
4 http://www.eclac.org/
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Figure 2.1: Foreign Direct Investment
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Source: Preliminary Overview of Latin America and the Caribbean, 18th April 2001, ECLAC, United Nations5
As detailed in the CEPAL report, during the past decade several trends have affected foreign
investment in the region, such as increased transnational activity, mergers and acquisitions, and
the shift of ownership in the banking industry.
2.1.1 Transnational activity:
Industrial ownership has become "transnationalized" in recent years. Foreign corporations
increased their share of the total sales of the region's 500 largest firms from 27% to 43% from
1990 to the end of the decade. During the same period, private domestic firms' share remained
under 40%, while state companies saw their share fall from 33% to 19%. Some examples
include the participation of Spanish corporations such as Telefonica and Iberia in several Latin
American industries. In the power generation sector, Endesa Espafia in Chile and the American
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AES Corporation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela were examples of major activity.
Repsol's purchase of YPF shares from private investors in 1999 was another major transaction in
primary sector. In terms of the 200 largest exporting firms, transnationals' share rose from 29%
to 41% between 1995 and 1999; private domestic firms' share fell from 37% to 33%, and state
firms' share fell from 34% to 26%.3 In the real estate office market, the increased presence of
transnationals has driven the demand for higher quality space over the same period.
2.1.2 Mergers & Acquisitions:
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity has increased dramatically in the past decade in not
only developed countries but also emerging markets such as Latin America. In the past two
years, M&As of private companies occurred mainly in the service sector, followed by the
primary sector, and then manufacturing. One of the largest transactions was by Telef6nica de
Espafia, which increased its controlling interest to almost 100% of its subsidiaries in Argentina,
Brazil and Peru, thus becoming the largest transnational company in Latin America, according to
the CEPAL report.
2.1.3 Banking Sector:
Major consolidations took place in Latin America's banking sector. Spanish banks Banco
Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico made large purchases. There have also been several foreign
acquisitions of large Mexican banks, most recently the $12.5bn purchase of Banamex by
Citibank of the US in May 2001, over 50% of the FDI originally projected for the year 2001.
Following this latest acquisition, 80% of the Mexican financial system is now in foreign hands, a
s http://www.eclac.org/
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long-term trend in the entire region that began with the sale of Banco Real to ABN Amro in
Brazil in 1998.6 As stated by Moody's Investor Service, the "effects of globalization and
recurring financial crisis - as well as certain cultural and governance aspects of the remaining
mega-banks- are shaping the future of banking in Latin America and are pushing inexorably
towards greater consolidation and foreign control."6
2.2 International Commerce
For Latin America the North American market represents more than half of its goods, followed
in order of importance by the inter-regional commerce, followed by the EU, and the Asian
countries. These numbers are influenced by the Mexican figure, which are the source of over
half of the region's exports. Mexico has a dependency of nearly 85% on the US for its exports.
The same occurs with the countries of the Andean countries (Venezuela, Peru, Colombia) due to
the export of petroleum, and Central America with the Maquiladora industry. Very different is
the structure of the commerce of exports in Mercosur, particularly with Argentina and Brazil, in
which 35% go throughout Latin America, followed by the EU (25%), then the US (15%), and
Japan and Asia (13%).
6 Moody's article: "The Fall of Bancomer and the Future of the Indigenous Mega-Banks in Latin America"
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Table 2.2: Trade Partners
Brazil (1999)
Country
Exports US
Argentina
Netherlands
Germany
Japan
Imports US
Argentina
Germany
Italy
Japan
Mexico (1999).
Country %
US 83.2
Canada 5.2
Japan 1.3
Spain 1.1
22.6
11.2
5.4
5.6
4.6
24.1
11.8
9.6
5.3
5.2
US
Germany
Japan
Korea
74.8
3.9
3.8
1.6
Source: EIU
2.2.1 Trade Agreements:
Mercosur
The Mercado Comfin del Sur (Mercosur) is a customs union established on January 1, 1995 that
is comprised of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay and two associate members (Bolivia
and Chile). The market represents over 230 million people and combined GDP of over $1.2
trillion. Mercosur is the third-largest trading bloc in the world after the European Union and
NAFTA. From 1990-1996 intra-group trade grew at an annual rate of 22%, to a value of $16 bn,
net foreign direct investment increased 33% per year reaching more than $40 bn during the
period.7
However, the unilateral decision of Brazil to devalue and float the Real has strained relations
within the trading bloc, especially with Argentina, a chief exporter to Brazil. Likewise,
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Argentina
Country
Mercosur
NAFTA
EU
Mercosur
NAFTA
EU
(2000)
32.0
14.2
17.5
28.6
22.4
22.9
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Argentina's recent emergency measures have called into question the future of the trade group.
There does not seem to be a consensus among the countries on the issue of currency. Chile
recently dropped its application for full membership of Mercosur and announced it would seek a
bilateral agreement with the US instead. Certainly, the outlook is not especially bright for the
trading bloc, reflected by the sentiment of one real estate player in the market: "Mercosur is
dead... Argentina killed it and it was Brazil's fault."8
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented on January 1, 1994
with the objective of removing most of the barriers to trade and investment among the United
States, Canada, and Mexico. 9
NAFTA opened previously protected Mexican industries (such as financial services) to foreign
investment, improved the legal environment for foreign investors and, by lowering tariffs on
trade between Mexico and the US and Canada, allowed companies from developed countries to
use Mexico as an export platform, taking advantage of the country's pool of low-cost labor and
proximity to the US market. Efforts to open up ports, railways, airports and gas distribution,
combined with increased macroeconomic stability in the second half of the 1990s, have also
resulted in increased foreign investment.' °
7 http://www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur/
8 Karl Trieschman, AIG Buenos Aires
9 http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/nafta.html
'o http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/
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NAFTA has helped launch Mexico as a world player, trailing only Brazil in terms of emerging
market FDI worldwide. Since the establishment of the trade agreement, Mexican exports to the
US have increased to 88% in 1998, placing it among one of the world's leading exporters.
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA):
The process leading to the conclusion of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was
initiated in Miami in 1994 at the first Summit of the Americas. The 34 countries attending the
Summit committed themselves to the establishment of a free trade zone in the Americas by the
year 2005. Formal negotiations were launched in Santiago in 1998 with the aim to create a huge
free trade area stretching from Alaska to Patagonia, with a combined GDP of more than $10,000
billion and a market of 800 million consumers."
2.3 Cultural Considerations
An important yet sometimes neglected consideration for the foreign investor in Latin America is
an understanding of the cultural distinctions that affect how the real estate game is played. This
section presents two of the more commonly given differences between this region and the US.
2.3.1 "Latin Americans love real estate"
Historically, Latin Americans have had a view of real estate quite contrary to that of North
Americans. Property in this region is less seen as something tradable and transitory, but rather as
a more permanent investment. Why is this the case? One possible reason is that generally
speaking middle and upper class people in Latin America change homes less than their
16
1 http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
counterparts in US. Perhaps due to the lack of transportation infrastructure, developments in
these countries are highly concentrated in urban agglomerations.
Many point out that Latin Americans are in general more family oriented than in North America.
For example, it is typical for sons and daughters to live at home until marriage, as opposed to the
US where it is more typical to move out for college or work. Because of this, people's
preferences in Latin America are to move less, especially compared to the highly mobile United
States where it is estimated that households move as often as once every six years.'2
A third factor in this cultural divide is the general absence of long-term debt in the region. Real
estate is usually an all equity investment for Latin Americans. The fact that real estate leases
have always allowed for indexation, either by inflation or construction costs, has identified real
estate as a good hedge against inflation in the local currency.
In the US the situation is generally quite different. The presence of attractive mortgage
financing, which is externally linked to capital markets, has made real estate a more risky asset
due to the leverage effect of debt. 3 While cheap mortgage financing makes it easier for
Americans to purchase a home, the risk of the investment is increased by the presence of
leverage. Americans view real estate as a riskier asset class than say, Treasury bonds, or other
fixed income securities. Latin Americans, on the other hand, traditionally buy and hold real
estate for its dividends (rents). Also, contrary to the US, people in this region do not view their
country's sovereign debt as the "risk-free benchmark", perhaps due to historic defaults. For
12 Real Estate and Urban Economics, Wheaton and DiPasquale
13 Brealey & Meyers, Principals of Corporate Finance
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example, in 1982 during the nationalization of the Mexican banking sector by President Lopez
Hurtado, all commercial deposits were seized and repaid in less liquid government bonds. In the
eyes of the Latin American general public, bricks and mortar are seen as closest to a risk-free
asset. Besides, compared with local currency denominated CD deposits at 6%, real estate yields
are more attractive.
Due to the lack of debt, real estate is not linked to the capital markets like in the US. As
illustrated by Fernando Bergamin of Brazil Realty, "if interest rates were to either double or
halve, property prices would not change." But the perception that real estate never loses value is
obviously flawed. Because people have an all equity investment and trading is generally thin,
properties are not marked-to-market on a regular basis. Consequently, there is a wide and
continuous bid-ask spread in the real estate investment market. Asking prices of real estate
remain relatively constant because owners often believe that values remain constant. In reality,
however, real estate rent and price data reflect the fact that values fluctuate, especially in times of
crisis.
2.3.2 A relationship based business environment
Another important cultural consideration for the foreign investor is the attitude toward business
relationships in general. This knowledge is key to understanding how the real estate game is
played in these markets.
From a historical perspective, few players, either high net-worth individuals or state owned
entities, have traditionally dominated these markets. With privatization and liberalization in
18
these countries, real estate has passed to a small number of players in the private sector (such as
individuals, companies or pension funds). Together with the small market size, the relatively
small number of participants has resulted in the real estate business being transacted often times
through informal and personal relationships. 4
In order to preserve this club atmosphere, and in view of the inefficiencies of their own legal
systems, the real estate business is focused on trying to reach consensus rather than focusing on
the legalities of the agreements. Latin American real estate is done on a relationship basis, as
opposed to the US where the contract binds all business activity.
A major contributor to the current market behavior is again the lack of long term financing.
According Ariel Turkie of Andean Asset Management, "the development of the real estate debt
markets in Argentina lags behind that of the United States by 20 to 30 years." Due to the
absence of major market arbitrators (such as lenders and secondary markets in general),
agreements are bilateral as opposed to multi-lateral in the case of the US. There are generally no
third parties or secondary markets which require strict, standardized underwriting. This lack of
standardization affects the strategy of foreign investors since there is a great deal of "recreating
the wheel" on each deal.
Property rights, land use regulation and enforcement are often not up to US standards. In many
cases both legislation and enforcement are weak. Lease contracts are seen as the foundation of
the real estate deal in the US, and tenants and landlords have faith that their contact will be
honored in a US court. This perception is not necessarily the case in Argentina, Brazil and,
14 Gabriel Fernandez, AIG Global Investment Group, July 2001 Interview
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perhaps even today, Mexico. The lack of emphasis on solid contracts often results in leases
which vary considerably from the US standard. As developer Ken Moscow exemplifies, "our
office leases can be three pages long in San Jose, Costa Rica versus 40 pages in Boston." s
This lack of transparency, together with a different value of time, can prolong due diligence and
closing of transactions. It is not uncommon for a deal to take more than a year to close. Tom
McDonald refers to Equity International's acquisition of Fondo de Valores Immobillarios to
illustrate this point: "it was like a cat with nine lives that was continually dying and coming
back."
Conclusion
In sum, for the foreign investor in this region it is important to highlight foreign direct
investment levels, which are a strong driver of real estate demand. On the other hand, cultural
attitudes towards real estate ownership are also a strong factor. When times are good, FDI levels
increase and foreign developers and investors follow suit. When times are bad, real estate is
viewed as a safe harbor for local investors.
15 Ken Moskow, American Venture Corp., July 2001 interview
20
3 MARKET COMPARISONS
16
16 Courtesy of The General Libraries, University of Texas at Austin
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The following tables and narratives provide a comparison of specific details of each country:
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The main sources of data for this section are intelligence reports
from CB Richard Ellis, Inc.'7 and the Economist Intelligence Unit.'8
3.1 Basic Country Facts
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Population 36.6m (1999) 164.0m (1999) 97.4m (2000)
Capital City Buenos Aires (pop. 13.3M) Brasilia (pop. 1.85M) Mexico DF (19.75M)
Other Major Cities" Cordoba (1.425M), Rosario Sdo Paulo (17.9M), Rio de Guadalajara (4. 1M),
(1.27M) Janeiro (10.65M) Monterrey (3.6M)
Area 2,737,000 sq. km 8,547,403 sq. km 1,953,162 sq. km
Population Density 13 per sq. km 19.9 per sq. km 50.98 per sq. km
Official Language Spanish Portuguese Spanish
Literacy Rate 96% (1995) 83% (1996) 90%
Infrastructure
Railways 35,753 km 26,895 km 26,595 km
Roads (paved) 42,282 km 184,140 km 108,803 km
Waterways 11,000 km navigable 50,000 km navigable 2,900 km navigable
Pipelines
Crude oil 4,090 km 2,000 km 28,200 km
Petroleum products 2,900 km 3,804 km 10,150 km
Natural gas 9,918 km 1,095 km 13,254 km
Land Use 73% cattle breeding; 4% 58% forests/woodlands; 57% pastures; 21%
arable crops; 18% mixed- 22% permanent pastures; arable land; 17%
use; 5% other 5% arable land; 15% other forests; 5% other
Land Area 2.7m sq km 8.5 lm sq km 1.9m sq km
3.2 Demographics and Domestic Wealth
The demographics in this region are one of the bigger drivers of demand for real estate and
interest of foreign investors. The current median age in Latin America is expected to increase to
over 32 years in the next 20-25 years. "This is not only a young population, but a young one that
17 CB Richard Ellis Latin American and Caribbean Headquarters, Country Intelligence Report and Real Estate
Market, October 2000
18 Economist Intelligence Unit, ISI Emerging Markets, Internet Securities, http://site.securities.com/
19 Brinkhoff: Principal Agglomerations of the World, http://www.citypopulation.de
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is entering the workforce, and will be earning more in the next 5 or 10 years", according to
Charles Lowery of Prudential Real Estate Investors.20
Mexico is the youngest of the three countries, with a median age of 22.8, followed by Brazil at
25.6, then Argentina at 28.8. To put these figures in perspective, the median ages of North
America and the EU are 30.6 and 37.6, respectively.
The population growth in these countries is also a positive trend. The age 20 to 59 segment of
the population is currently expanding at a rapid rate, and is expected to continue growing rapidly
during the next ten years. Census data allows a projected growth rate of 2% annually in the
coming 5 years and 1% annually in the next 5 years.21
Domestic wealth in the region has increased disproportionately between rural areas and urban
agglomerations. For example, the average household buying power (or, the average amount each
20 http://www.excelsior.com.mx/0104/010405/fin05.html
21 Prudential Real Estate Investors, US Census Bureau
22 Prudential REI, Latin America 2001; Strategy Research Corporation,
http://www. strategyresearch.com/pdf/july2001 .pdf
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
Population Growth 1.3% per year (1995-99) 1.3% (average, 1995-99)(a) 1.3% (average, 1996-
2000)
Age Structure
Below 15 years 29.4% 31.6% 34%
Between 15-64years 61.1% 63% 62%
Age 65 and older 9.5% 5.4% 4%
Life Expectancy 73 years 67 years 71.5 years
Median Age 200021 28.8 25.6 22.8
Median Age 2025 35.0 35.2 31.8
Average Household $19,989 $7,132 $20,679
Buying Power 22 Buenos Aires: $23,798 Sdo Paulo: $14,527 Mexico DF: $30,959
Rio de Janeiro: $8,182 Monterrey: $23,702
household could spend on an annual basis) in urban Brazil is $8,192, compared to an average
rural household buying power of $2,920. In the region as a whole, the average urban buying
power is $11,352, versus a rural average of $6,552.
3.3 Political Structure and Climate
Argentina:
Argentina's presidential system is checked by a bicameral Congress comprising a 257-member
Chamber of Deputies, representatives of which are elected for four-year terms, and a 72-member
Senate, to be directly elected from 2001. The president serves a four-year term. The ruling
Alianza coalition, formed by the UCR and Frepaso, has a precarious position in Congress. It is
the largest force in the lower house, but lacks a majority. The PJ has a majority in the Senate at
least until the 2001 mid-term elections and also controls the important governorships, thereby
representing an impediment to governability. 8
In the early 80s, Argentina suffered from economic stagnation and hyperinflation. In 1983 the
first democratic government came into power, ending many years of military rule. In 1989,
Carlos Menem of the Partido Justicialista was elected president based on a populist campaign.
However, once in power, he abandoned the party's ideology. The Peronists' policy of
liberalization and privatization attracted foreign investment into the country. This period of
rapid growth was undermined by Menem's failure to execute fiscal and structural reforms,
leaving the country vulnerable to the Asia Crisis, followed by Russia and then Brazil. Argentina
entered into a recession and experienced almost no growth in 1999 and 2000. Unemployment
also rose in the same period. In December 1999 Fernando de la Rua succeeded Menem. Mr. de
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la Rua's term has been marred by bribery scandals and political fallout, including the resignation
of the vice president. This, combined with the ongoing recession and fears of default, were part
of the reason why in March 2001 Menem's former economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, was
brought back into office. With emergency powers from Congress, Mr. Cavallo has become the
central figure in Argentine politics.
Brazil:
Democratic rule resumed in Brazil in 1985 and a new constitution was ratified in 1988. The
president executes policy approved by the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies and the 81-seat Senate,
with constitutional review by an independent judiciary. Although the president wields
considerable power and can resort to temporary decrees to push through legislation, the
provisions of the 1988 constitution give Congress ample capacity to frustrate the executive.
Brazil's current president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is currently serving his second term,
marked by the devaluation of the Real in 1998. Major fiscal and structural reform challenges
remain, but the market sentiment towards Brazil's economic recovery is considerably better than
in neighboring Argentina. Nonetheless, Corruption scandals and an energy crisis are threatening
to undermine the government as it enters the second half of its term. Several ministers and the
former leader of the Senate have been forced to resign. The scandals have damaged the
government's image and weakened support for Cardoso.
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Mexico:
The Mexican political system is presidential, bicameral (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) and
federal (32 states). The president is elected every six years and the 500 members of the Chamber
of Deputies are elected every three years. In the Senate, 75% of its members are elected directly
for a six-year term; the remaining 25% by proportional representation.
For the 70 year previous to the election of Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional in July
2000, Mexico was ruled by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI. While the new
president reflects Mexico's direction toward free market policies and economic liberalization, the
nationalistic PRI is still the largest party in the Mexican congress. Fox started with high
approval ratings with the general public, but his greatest challenge has been to pass crucial
legislation in congress.
Fox is focused on deregulation and increasing the competitiveness of Mexican industry. By the
end of his six-year term in office the president plans to generate 1.3m jobs per year and to boost
economic growth to 7% per year. In the short term, however, this is being challenged by the
economic slowdown in the US. 8
3.4 Economic Indicators and Forecasts
The following charts and graphs summarize the current status of each country's economies.
Also included are economic forecasts according to the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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As shown in Figure 3.1, unemployment has remained relatively stable throughout the region, in
Brazil and Mexico in particular. Argentina, on the other hand, experienced a tripling of it
unemployment level between 1991 and 1995, and has recently leveled off at 16.4% as of May
2001. 3
Figure 3.1: Urban Unemployment
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
Currency Psl:US$1 (end-2000); R1.81:US$1 (1999, ave); Ps9.46:US$1 (2000,
Psl:US$1 (May 1st 2001) R2.489:US$1 (Aug 15th, average);
2001) Ps9.075:US$1 (Aug
15t 2001)
Inflation -0.3% (average, 1996- 17.3% (average, 1995-99); 16.7% (average,
2000); -0.7% (2000; year- 4.9% (1999, average); 8.9% 1996-2000); 9.5%
end) (1999, year-end) (2000, average)
GDP: US$277.9bn (2000) US$529.5bn (1999, at US$561bn (2000, at
market exchange rate) market exchange
rate)
GDP Growth 2.7% (average, 1996-2000); 2.1 % (average, 1995-99); 5.5% (average, 1996-
-0.5% (2000) 1% (1999) 2000); 6.9% (2000)
GDP Per Capita: US$7,505 (2000; market : US$3,230 (1999, at US$5,764 (2000, at
exchange rate); US$10,589 market exchange rate)(a); market exchange
(2000; PPP) US$6,937 (1999, at PPP)(a) rate); US$10,075
(2000, at PPP)
Gross domestic product in the region has been relatively volatile. Annual growth rates of GDP,
as shown in Figure 3.2, have varied from -6.2% for Mexico to +10.6% for Argentina over the 10
year period.
Figure 3.2: Gross Domestic Product
Source: ECLAC, United Nations4
Argentina:
After three years of recession and a series of high-profile corruption scandals (Senate Crisis,
Menem's imprisonment), politicians in Argentina are facing growing public dissatisfaction.
Domingo Cavallo, who became the Fernando de la Rua government's third economy minister in
March 2001, has sought to promote recovery through targeted measures designed to boost
competitiveness despite a high country risk premium and fears about the government's solvency.
However, nervous financial markets have not been willing to wait for recovery to come. During
the first two weeks of July, market jitters, along with Argentina's risk premium, increased so
much that Mr. Cavallo was forced to introduce an emergency plan to slash the fiscal deficit to
zero with immediate effect. Most recently Argentina's credit rating was lowered by Moody's
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GDP: Annual Growth Rates
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Investors Service to Caal on concern the country won't be able to erase its budget deficit to help
ensure debt payments. As a result of the spending cuts and a negative external environment, a
return to economic growth in 2001 is unlikely.
Figure 3.3 Argentine Stock Market
ARGENTINA MERYAL - PRICE INDEX
900 FROM 7-22-94 TO 7-27-01 WEEKLY
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
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2000 2001
Source: DATASTREAM
Output growth is forecasted be flat in 2001, the result of severely restricted access to financing,
high interest rates, the slump in investment and adverse external conditions. The several years
have been extremely volatile for the Argentinean stock market, the Merval (see Figure 3.3). This
volatility is projected to persist at least into the near future.
29
800 .
700
800
500
400
300
200 X· X _· ·X 
Despite the weaker exchange rate introduced for trade transactions in June, the EIU does not
expect any immediate change to the official one-to-one parity with the dollar. Though the
rigidity of the dollar peg hinders market efficiency by maintaining unnaturally high prices,
affecting Argentine exports to both Europe and Brazil, whose currencies have lost against the
dollar since late 1998.
Figure 3.4: Argentine Currency
Source: Datastream
Brazil:
Brazil's economic prospects have been adversely affected by pressures on the Real caused by
worries about Argentina and instability in global financial markets. These problems have already
forced the Banco Central do Brasil to raise interest rates by 150 basis points in recent months to
16.75%. Further tightening cannot be ruled out if instability in global financial markets persists
or the fiscal reforms currently under way in Argentina fail to restore confidence.
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Argentinean Peso to US $ from 7-27-1988 to 7-27-
2001
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The Brazilian stock market has been trending upward since 1994, with the exception of struggles
between late 1997 and 1998 (see Figure 3.5). The Bovespa is by far the most active stock market
in Latin America, nearly twice the size of the Mexican Bolsa23 .
Figure 3.5: Brazilian Stock Market
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One of the strengths of the Brazilian economy was that it was able to float its currency without
incurring high inflation. But the behavior of the Brazilian Real depends greatly on neighboring
Argentina, in addition to other factors such as net FDI. In the case of a default by Argentina, the
Real could fall much beyond the levels that followed the 1998 devaluation. The EIU forecasts
that the Real could even top R3:US$1. On the other hand, the EIU notes, "if the crisis in
Argentina begins to stabilize, global financial markets become less volatile and the energy crisis
23 Emerging Stock Market Review, Standard & Poors, December 2000
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begins to abate, we would expect the Real to retrace at least part of its recent depreciation, which
we view as overshooting".
Figure 3.6: Brazilian Currency
Source: Datastream
Mexico:
One of the critical issues for Vicente Fox is the previously mentioned fiscal reform. The
legislation has been slowed recently by Congress, postponing passage until at least the end of
2001. Pass fiscal reform would significantly boost international confidence in the country and
would allow Fox to pursue further privatization programs in industries such as electricity. This
is one of the signs long awaited by US rating agencies to grant Mexico an investment grade debt
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Brazilian Real to US $
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rating, which would attract previously untapped foreign capital (US pension funds), lowering
Mexican bond yields and interest rates.
Inflation in Mexico has subsided and should continue to decline in the near future. Consumer
Price Index growth in year 2000 was 9.5%, considerably lower than levels of the mid-90s. The
EIU forecasts inflation to be 7% by end-2001, before decreasing further to 5-5.5% by end-2002.
The peso has been relatively stable in recent years. Its value has been backed by the inflows of
dollar-denominated investments into Mexico. The general view in the market is that the
currency is overvalued against the dollar and that the peso will depreciated in the near future.
The current uncertainty in Argentina, and concerns related to the US, seem to point toward a
softening of the currency. Although the EIU expects the peso to weaken slightly from its current
position of strength, the movement will not be large enough to spark a resurgence of inflation. 8
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Figure 3.7: Mexican Currency
Source: Datastream
Perhaps triggered by an overvaluation of the peso, the Bolsa has been on a downward trend after
witnessing dramatic gains from 1999 into early 2000 (see Figure 3.8).
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Mexican Peso to US $
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Figure 3.8: Mexican Stock Market
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Since the incorporation of NAFTA, Mexico has been kept afloat by the success of the US
economy. Mexico, as its second largest trading partner after Canada, is highly dependent on US
demand for its exports. The slowdown may affect one area often overlooked by analysts: dollar
remittances from the millions of Latin Americans working abroad. To Mexico alone, they're
worth $6 billion to $8 billion a year, trailing only petroleum exports as a source of hard
currency.24
Having grown by 6.9% in 2000, the EIU forecasts GDP to grow by just 1.8% in 2001 as a result
of a slowdown in the US. Expected recovery in the US economy will allow Mexico's growth to
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accelerate to a forecasted 4% in 2002, owing to higher exports and stronger private consumption.
Inflation remains well under control and is project to end 2001 at around 7%.
Table 3.1: EIU Forecasts
2000 2001 2002 2002
GDP (real % change)
Argentina 2.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.7%
Brazil 4.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.6%
Mexico 5.0% 3.5% 4.3% 4.4%
Consumer Prices
Argentina -0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 2.2%
Brazil 6.1% 4.9% 4.3% 3.1%
Mexico 10.0% 9.5% 8.3% 7.5%
Exchange Rate
Argentina 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Brazil 1.81 1.81 1.85 1.86
Mexico 9.86 10.75 11.35 11.87
Current Account Bal.
Argentina -13.8% -14.1% -12.3% -14.1%
Brazil -24.9% -24.9% -25.5% -26.3%
Mexico -18.7% -23.1% -24.9% -26.9%
Source: EIU
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24 As US Sneezes, Neighbors Fear a Cold - the Downturn up North Could Quash Recovery of Latin Economies,
WSJ via Dow Jones Interactive, 12/12/2000
3.5 Real Estate Market Fundamentals
The following table summarizes the market reports of CB
of 1st quarter 2001.25
Richard Ellis, Inc. for each market as
3.6 Real Estate Structural and Legal Issues
This section compares the real estate structural issues (i.e. the rules of the game) for each market.
The relevant issues are broken down into the following categories: taxes, ownership, leasing and
financing. The main source of data for this section is an October 2000 Country Intelligence
Report by CB Richard Ellis, Inc.'s Latin American and Caribbean Headquarters.
37
Buenos Aires Sao Paulo Rio de Janeiro Mexico DF
Total Office Stock (in 3,610,245 4,074,000 2,246,000 3,197,450
square meters)
Class A Office Stock 1,373,217 N/A N/A 1,820,818
Non-Class A Stock 2,237,028 N/A N/A 1,576,632
Vacancy Levels - 7.8% 8.0% (class A & 0.4% 13.0
Class A non-class A)
Vacancy Levels - 1.0% N/A 7.0% 22.6
Non-Class A
Net Absorption (year 145,000 109,000 N/A 350,000
2000)
Asking Rents on Class $27.00 R$48.00 (class A R$53.00 (class A & $27.50
A Office Stock (per & non-class A) non-class A)
SM per year)
Asking Rents on Non- $13.00 N/A N/A $15.50
Class A Office Stock
(per SM per year)
New-construction (as 262,419 214,000 61,000 309,154
of May 2001)
25 www.cbrichardellis.com
3.6.1 Taxes
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Corporate Income Tax 35% 34% 35%
Assets Tax 1.0% None 1.8%
Employee Profit None None 10%
Sharing
Withholding Tax on None None 7.69%
Dividends
Tax on branch profits None None 7.69%
Withholding Tax on 15.05% or 35% 15% 4.9%, 10%, 15%,
Interest 21%, or 40%
Withholding Tax on 17.5%, 28% or 31.5% 15% 15% or 40%
Royalties
Withholding Tax on 21.0%, 28.0%, or 31.5% 25% 21%, 30% or 40%
Services
Withholding Tax on 14.0% or 21.0% 15% 5%, 15%, 21%, or
Operating Leases 40%
Depreciation 2.0% buildings 4.0% buildings 5.0% buildings
Allowance 20.0% vehicles 20.0% vehicles 25 or 71% vehicles
10.0% machinery 10-20% machinery 5-25% machinery
33.0% computers 20.0% computers 30.0% computers
Loss carryforward 5 years Indefinite 10 years
VAT or sales tax 21.0% VAT ICMS is 18% 15% VAT
ISS is < 10%
IPI is 10-15%
Capital gains tax on None 15% or 0% (between non- 20% gross basis
sale of shares by non- residents) 40% net basis
residents
Tax on gross receipts Deductible from Income N/A N/A
Tax
Tax on Interest 15% paid by local N/A N/A
borrowers to local financial
institutions or on corporate
bonds.
Financial transaction N/A IOF is 0-7% N/A
tax
Social Security N/A COFINS is 3% N/A
Financing Tax
Social Integration Tax N/A PIS is 0.65% N/A
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3.6.2 Ownership
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Type of ownership Freehold and Freehold is most common Freehold and Leasehold
condominium are contracted
Foreign ownership Generally unrestricted Foreign direct investors Foreign ownership of
except in certain areas of must seek approval from land or water within the
national security, such as Central Bank; Land cannot restricted zone, except
frontier zones. be purchased within 150 through a bank trust, is
km of the border or coasts; prohibited. *
750-hector limitation for
foreign investment in 10
Sao Paulo municipalities.
Public property Yes Yes Yes
register
Notary fees 0.75-1.5% (no fixed percentages) 1.0% - 2.0% plus VAT
Real Estate N/A N/A 2.0-3.3%
Acquisition Tax
Transfer tax 1.5% N/A N/A
Provincial stamp 1% on execution of ITBI is 2.0% in Rio de N/A
duty preliminary sales Janeiro and between 2.0-
contract, 4% on execution 6.0% in Sdo Paulo; based
of notary deed of on gross transfer value of
conveyance (in Buenos the property; payable by the
Aires the rate is 0.75% to purchaser
2.50% of the transaction)
Provincial real 0.2-1.5% of the value of N/A N/A
estate tax the property (land +
buildings)
Municipal tax 0.57% of the value of the IPTU is levied at between N/A
property annually 0.60 - 2.00$R/usable
m 2/month
Value Added Tax 21.0%, applicable on new ICMS is 18% 15.0% on purchase
and refurbished buildings price except on sale of
only land or structures used
for residential purposes
Broker's Fee 3.0% to 5.0% 4.0% to 5.0% plus Imposto 4.0% - 5.0%
sobre Serviqos (ISS) of
5.0%.
* The restricted zone includes all of Baja California and land located within 100 km from
Mexico's borders or 50 km from its coastline. Ownership of non-residential real estate within
the restricted zone through a foreign-owned Mexican corporation is also allowed, provided that
approval is obtained from the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE).
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3.6.3 Leasing
The table below represents the standard leasing terms for office space in each market.
3.6.4 Financing and Secondary Markets
One of the biggest deterrents for foreign investors in the region has been the lack of financing
available locally. On the other hand, being a capital constrained market also represents an
opportunity for the well-heeled foreign investor. This section outlines the financing options that
are currently available in each market, the alternative financing schemes that are used in debt-
free markets, and the status of secondary markets in the region.
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Argentina Brazil Mexico
Type of lease Net Net Net
Term 3 to 5 years 5 years 3 to 5 years
Measurement Square Meter Square Meter Square Meter
Denomination Argentine Peso Brazilian Real Mexican Pesos or US
Dollars
Payment Monthly in advance Monthly in advance Monthly, in advance
Frequency
Escalation Rent adjustment every Rent adjustment every three Rent adjustment
three years years annually according to
Indice Nacional de
Precios al Consumidor
.___ ___ ___ ,__ ~(INPC).
Rent Indexation Based on US CPI Annually, based on Indice Peso-denominated rent
Geral de Pre9os do annually adjusted by
Mercado (IGPM) General Rent Price
Index; dollar-
denominated rent
adjusted by US CPI
Early Termination Allowed after first six There is no statutory There is no statutory
months, subject to 60 provision on commercial provision on
days prior written notice. real estate commercial real estate
Penalty is 1 /2 months rent
during the first year or 1
month of rent thereafter
Security Deposit Two months' rent A renewable letter of credit Two months' rent
Broker's Fee 3.0% - 5.0% 10 - 12% of first year's rent 3.0% - 5.0%
plus ISS
Private Debt
The debt financing market in Mexico is developing once again. According to Hector Klerian of
Jones Lang LaSalle in Mexico City, several lenders were hit hard by the devaluation of the peso
in 1995 and many stopped lending in the years that followed. Recently, however, GE Capital,
Heller Financial and Scotiabank/Inverlat have been originating loans on commercial real estate
with increasing competitiveness.
According to the website of GE Capital Real Estate in Mexico, the typical underwriting terms for
office buildings that they offer are as follows:26
26 http://www.gecapitalrealestate.com.mx/
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Collateral: First mortgages on Class A office buildings located in strong sub-
markets. Preferred market is Mexico City, but will consider Guadalajara
and Monterrey.
Currency: US Dollar denominated financing for buildings with US Dollar
denominated leases. Some flexibility with buildings containing a mix of
Dollar and Peso leases
Loan Size: US$5,000,000 and up
Rates: Floating over LIBOR or Fixed over US Treasury Rates
*Pricing: Construction: 500 - 550 bps over LIBOR
Permanent: 375 - 425 bps over LIBOR
Commitment Up to a 1% fee
Fee:
Loan-to-Value: 65% to 75%
Amortization: 10 - 15 years
Term: Typically 5-7 years**
Pre-Payment / Flexible terms
Lock-out:
Guarantor: Non-recourse
Due Diligence: Required are environmental & structural engineering reports, seismic
study (where applicable) and cash flow audit
*These sample spreads were given in a June 2001 interview with GE Capital in Mexico City.
GE indicated that these rates are sometimes lower due to mitigating factors such as high quality
sponsorship, collateral, tenancy, etc.
**The most common term/amortization combination is 7/13, though amortization periods can be
pushed out as far as 17 years. A credit tenant loan can fully-amortize over a 15-year schedule
(depending on the term of the lease).
In Argentina and Brazil, long-term debt financing is not a viable option for owners of
commercial property. Commercial mortgage loans are typically priced as a spread over a
benchmark, such as US Treasuries or LIBOR. In Argentina, the 1 month BAIBOR, the Buenos
Aires inter-bank offering rate, has reached 35% in July 2001, reflecting the high perception of
risk in this country. In Brazil the intra-bank rate, known as the CDI, averaged 20.5% from 1986
to 200027. This in effect makes real estate debt financing cost prohibitive in Argentina and
Brazil.
Self-Financing
In Argentina and Brazil, the lack of debt financing has resulted in practices of "self financing".
Examples of self-financing include the pre-selling of offices or apartments. According to Turkie,
the buyer of an apartment or office floor will often pay a down payment of around 5% and
approximately 50% of the purchase price in monthly installments during construction, with the
balance due of completion. The practice reduces the developer's capital needs and, according to
Daniel Citron formerly of Brazil Realty and now with Tishman Speyer, the practice is
27 Ministdrio do Planejamento, Orgamento e Gestao/Brazil Realty
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"extremely profitable, when successful." 28 The picture below shows the cash flows of a typical
pre-sale scheme for residential development:
Figure 3.9: Self-financing Schemes
Self-financing of residential development: 12
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Launch s............... Last
..... unch..... Installment
Land
Purchase
End of
Project
' ............ .. .. ..........
.... . ....... ... ..... . .... .Conio
Construction
Construction Construction Ends
Starts Accelerates
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Accumulated Net Accumulated
........ Cash Cash ...... Cash
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Source: Brazil Realty
Construction starts once the proceeds from pre-sales have reached approximately 20% of the
total development cost (to cover the cost of land and preliminary construction). While the graph
shows a simplified accumulated cash inflow stream, the balloon payments at completion and
transfer of deed often accelerate the receipt of cash flows. Below is a similar scheme used for
the commercial sector, where developers raise capital by selling participations in the project:
28 Daniel Citron, Brazil Realty Presentation at the Global Property Forum in Washington DC. October 2000
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Figure 3.10: Self-financing Schemes (cont.)
Self-financing of commercial development:13
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Public Equity
In addition to the high country risk, the price of debt in these markets is higher than the US due
to underdeveloped secondary markets. The lack of secondary trading of debt and equity, like in
the US CMBS and REIT markets, effects the availability and pricing of debt and equity.
Fundos de Investimento Imobilidrios ("FII") are the Brazilian version of the US Real Estate
Investment Trust ("REIT"). FIIs were created in 1993 to provide liquidity to developers and
allow small investors to participate in large real estate projects. The FIIs are currently private
and closed entities which must be managed by financial institutions that hold the fiduciary
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ownership of the fund's assets. The fund's shares are sold through private and/or public
placements.
The tax structure of FIIs is similar to that of REITs. In order avoid paying corporate taxes, the
fund must distribute at least 95% of net income to its shareholders. Shareholders are taxed 20%
upon receipt of dividends and capital gains. An example of a single asset FII offering is the
Continental Plaza in Sao Paulo (see Recent Activity section).
According to Citron, the target market of these securities, the general public, will need to be
educated and assuaged of their perception of risk. While FIIs are just participations in projects
or portfolios as opposed to entities as is the case with REITs, they still have a higher perception
of risk compared to direct ownership (see "Cultural Considerations"). In addition, there are legal
constraints which must be overcome with the current Fundos de Investimento Imobiliirio
legislation.
A current controversy with the selling of FlIs is the fear among industry players that they could
be used as a method of cheating investors. Some sources indicated that FIIs will often advertise
a high, guaranteed introductory return of 12-20%. However, after the introductory period ends
in year 2 or 3, the current return will stabilize at a much lower level. While unsophisticated retail
investors will buy-in for the high current return, the actual IRR of the investment will turn out to
be poor.29 Others suspect that FIIs could also be a way for Brazilian pension funds to dispose of
property without having to recognize large losses (see "Investment Exits" section for background
on Brazilian pension funds).
In Argentina and Mexico, the Fideicomiso has become a popular ownership structure for
foreigners and also as a vehicle for securitizing single assets or portfolios. In Mexico, the
structure is similar to trusts set up in the United States, but a Mexican bank must be designated
as the trustee and, as such, has title to the property and is the owner of record. The Mexican
Government created the fideicomiso to reconcile the problems involved in developing the
restricted zone and to attract foreign capital. This enabled foreigners, as beneficiaries of the
trusts, to "own" land located in the restricted zone without violating the law.
In Argentina, there is a distinction between a fideicomiso ordinario (as above) and fideicomisos
financieros. The financial fideicomisos differ from the fideicomiso ordinario in two ways, the
first being the existence of a fiduciary and the second being the existence of shares. These shares
can be representative of a fixed-income security (debt) or certificates of participation (equity).
This class of fideicomiso allows the access of institutional investors such as pension funds,
insurance companies, and open-ended funds. The graphic below depicts the general structure
of a typicalfideicomiso:
29 June 2001 Interview, Fernando Bergamin, Brazil Realty
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Figure 3.11: Fideicomisos
.HodiJer of Ihesh dib1 bori ds of
Source: Nicols Malumian, PricewaterhouseCoopers
Public Debt
The commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) markets in Latin America are not fully
developed due primarily to the fact that the primary mortgage markets are too thin and
inconsistent. Each country has its own underwriting standards, making pooling across borders
very difficult. In addition to reducing inflation, establishing uniform currency policies, and
increasing loan production, the capital markets themselves are too shallow to support a robust
CMBS market. Despite its infancy, in each country there are a number of groups who are
dedicated to developing the secondary mortgage market. Although it is not the focus of this
report, residential real estate has been leading the way for securitization of commercial property.
In Argentina the Banco Hipotecario, the country's largest mortgage bank, IRSA and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) created a secondary mortgage bank known as
Corporacion Financiera Hipotecaria. The CFH's goal is the creation and development of a
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secondary mortgage market in Argentina, providing market players with access to financial
resources at suitable terms and rates for the growth of the primary mortgage market. Since its
formation in 1997, the bank has launched four transactions, the last one being BHN IV Mortgage
Trust. The offering, which totaled $180 million, was the largest transaction to date and the first
to utilize political risk insurance. The top tranche was rated an A-1 by Moody's, nine notches
above the "sovereign ceiling" for Argentina at the time.30
Brazil has also made several significant steps toward establishing a secondary mortgage market.
First, in November 1997, the government passed a law that created a new real estate finance
system, Sistema de Financiamento Imobilidrio (SFI). The law established conditions for
securitization and the development of a secondary mortgage market in the country. This
legislation was followed in 1998 and 1999 by resolutions that revised the housing finance
system, Sistema Financeiro da Habitafdo (SFH), and further defined the legal framework for
securitization.31
In 1997 Brazil also saw the establishment of its first securitization company known as
Companhia Brasileira de Securitiza;ao ("CIBRASEC"). CIBRASEC is a private sector entity
created to build Brazil's first secondary market for real estate backed securities.32 Further
progress included the creation of Certificados de Recebiveis Imobilidrios ("CRIs"), a type of
security backed by mortgages acquired from financial institutions.
30 http://www.brokernews.net/News/newsmakers/newsO2160300.htm
31 Standard & Poors "Securitization in Latin America 2000"
32 http://www.cibrasec.com.br/
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Brazilian Securities, the mortgage securitization arm of investment bank Ourinvest S.A., was
also created with the specific purpose to develop the secondary market for real estate mortgages.
Ourinvest also originates mortgages through Brazilian Mortgages Companhia Hipotecaria, a
partnership between Banco Ourinvest and Fabio Nogueira. 3
In July 2000, Rio Bravo acquired Finpac Consultoria Financeira Ltda, one of Brazil's top
independent real estate structured finance firms34. Finpac was renamed Rio Bravo Consultoria
Financeira Ltda, which, as one of Brazil's first real estate structured finance firms, is actively
securitizing residential receivables through the issuance by its wholly owned affiliate - Rio
Bravo Securitizadora S.A.34
Other important participants in the Brazilian secondary market include commercial banks such as
Unibanco, and Itau. However, economic conditions, lack of investor acceptance, concerns over
legal infrastructure and tax constraints are primary barriers to further activity in Brazil's
secondary mortgage market.
In Mexico the MBS market is developing, especially with the residential sector. Commercial
MBS also is developing with the recent $60 million securitization by J.P Morgan of an office
building leased to PricewaterhouseCoopers in Mexico City.35
33 http://www.brazilianmortgages.com.br/: June 2001 interview with Fabio Nogueira
34 http://www.riobravo.com.br: June 2001 interview with Eduardo Machado
35 Moody's Investor Service
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4 FOREIGNINVESTMENTINLATINAMEPJRICANREAL ESTATE
This chapter first reviews some of the current thinking on international real estate investment,
specifically the question of quantifying the "foreign risk premium". Then the discussion is
related to Latin America by outlining the specific risks for the foreign investor in the region as
well as the strategies for mitigating them. After surveying the risks, the investor's opportunities
are presented as well as the "exit" strategies that are available in the present and future.
When discussing international investment in real estate there are generally two perspectives to
consider. The first is that of the passive risk manager. The main motivation for this investor to
venture abroad is the benefit of diversification. The second perspective on international
investing is that of the opportunist: an investor who seeks to achieve superior returns by
exploiting market inefficiencies.
Professor Timothy Riddiough is doubtful that institutional investors are "fleet enough of foot to
achieve superior risk-adjusted returns abroad." However, he does believe that diversification
benefits can be derived from international investment. Riddiough cites a study by GPR that
looked at returns and volatility of country specific, publicly traded real estate firms.36 The results
showed that "systematic risk at both the country and global levels often matters, that there is a
significant amount of variation in the estimated relations across countries, and that there is a
significant amount of idiosyncratic risk is most cases." The existence of country specific factors
and idiosyncratic risk would suggest that they could at least be partially diversified away by
investing in multiple countries.
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The diversification argument also works due to the low correlation between some of these
countries. Most countries' real estate markets are more heterogeneous than the relatively diverse
United States. This, combined with the low correlation, suggests that diversification benefits can
be derived from investing in foreign real estate.
Despite the fact that diversification may be the strongest argument for investment in foreign real
estate, opportunity was also strong force in attracting the current foreign investment players to
Latin America. Some groups have raised funds specifically targeting the region, such as JP
Morgan/Peabody with their Argo 1 & 2 funds. It can be assumed that the clients of these funds,
institutions and/or private investors, are not allocating 100% of their resources to this region, so
diversification is a factor as well. On the other hand, the opportunity of getting higher returns
than in the US or Europe is also a reason why they're there. In other words, both the appetite for
higher returns and for greater diversification play a role in the decision to enter these markets.
4.1 The Foreign Risk Premium
The decision of whether or not to invest in Latin America, from an opportunistic or portfolio
perspective, usually begins with an assessment of the excess return required to make up for the
additional risk assumed. This section summarizes the "hurdle rate" analysis of different
companies who are active in international real estate investment.
According to Ric Lewis of Curzon Global Partners, due to perhaps a "hangover" from previous
failures in foreign markets, many fund managers "have built into their return expectations a
specific premium for assuming property-related investment risk outside of their domestic market
36 Tim Riddiough, Class Notes 2001, (name specific study)
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- a tolling charge they refer to as the 'international risk premium'. This premium is an arbitrary
incremental additional return requirement assigned to all investment strategies focused outside of
the investor's domestic market."37
The argument against this arbitrary premium is that investors cannot expect higher returns
simply by investing abroad since foreign capital should not be paid a premium above domestic
capital. In the long run this arbitrage could not be sustainable. As Lewis states, "an investor
cannot secure arbitrary premiums for subjective rather than market-based factors".
To qualify this argument, Prudential Real Estate Investors points out that the myth of the foreign
risk premium is most vivid in cross-border investments between two core markets, such as the
US and Japan. In the long run, country risks of core countries tend to converge. For example,
today Japan is perceived in the short run to be riskier than the United States, while 10 years ago
this perception was reversed. "Hence, for investors placing capital from one core market to
another core market, the foreign risk premium is more myth than reality."38
Nonetheless, in emerging markets such as Latin America the risks are often times much greater
than in core markets. The investor in this region should require a higher return to match the
higher assumed risk. However, if the risk is priced correctly, the "risk-adjusted" return for
investing in emerging markets should equal that of a core market in the long run.
37 Ric Lewis, Curzon Global Partners, "Global Diversification of Real Estate Portfolios: At What Price Fear"
38 Prudential Real Estate Investors, "Myths and Realities of International Real Estate Investing", Nov '99
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4.1.1 Categorization approach
For all potential investors there are two main approaches to estimating the "hurdle rate" required
for investing abroad: the categorization-based method and market-based method.
The categorization-based method involves assigning a risk premium to various categories of risk
(country, currency, etc.) to build-up an overall risk premium over their own risk-free rate. To
illustrate, a US investor assessing an investment in Brazil should add a 20.5% premium above
the US risk-free rate of 6%, an example given in LaSalle Investment Management's Investment
Strategy Annual Report:39
Figure 4.1: Risk Premiums
Country and Property Market Risk Premiums
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m Currency Risk
mCountry Risk
Source: LaSalle Investment Management, "Investment Strategy Annual" 2000
39 LaSalle Investment Management, "Investment Strategy Annual Report", 2000
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According to LaSalle IM, this practice "reminds investors to be conscious of all the various types
of risk that they encounter when they leave their home countries." LaSalle also points out that
country risk, although often being the largest component of emerging market risk, is only one
component of the hurdle rate. For example, "a hurdle rate of more than 25% is appropriate when
evaluating very safe investments in a risky market, but is also may be appropriate to seek that
same rate of return on riskier investments in a much more stable market."
According to LaSalle, the main components for building the international risk premiums are:
* Country Risk
* Currency Risk
* Property Market Transparency
* Property Market Fundamentals
* Operations
* Leverage
* Ownership/Management Structure
There are a few drawbacks to the categorization-based approach. Quantifying each component is
challenging and subjective. Some of the components, such as country risk and currency, could
be related to one another and thus double-counted in the hurdle rate. The issue of time also adds
difficulty to this analysis. Many of these risk components are not static, as represented by this
snapshot approach, but rather are dynamic and more difficult to quantify. For example, as shown
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in Figure 4.1, an investor would have favored a deal in Argentina over a similar transaction in
Mexico (probably quite the opposite today).
4.1.2 Market approach
The market-based method uses statistical evidence from publicly traded securities and country
credit ratings to calculate an overall risk premium. Prudential Real Estate Investors developed a
country risk premium based on country stock market returns and country credit ratings from the
journal Institutional Investor. PREI's model only addresses country risk, not real estate specific
risks such as transparency or liquidity. But PREI argues that country risk should already capture
a significant portion of the real estate-specific risks.
This model was estimated in
Institutional Investor. Based
February 2000 using country market returns and credit ratings from
on the data set, the equation was estimated to be40:
Ri = 30.78 - 5.43*Ln(Ci)
Table 4.1 shows the results of PREI's February 2000 study as well as the figures updated as of
March 2001:
40 The relationship between expected return and country risk is a log-linear function based on a Erb, Harvey and
Viskanta study entitled "Expected Returns and Volatilities in 135 Countries."
55
Table 4.1: Country Risk Premiums
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
United States
Feb 2000
Credit Score
42.4
36.5
48.2
90.9
Expected
Return
21.0%
22.8%
19.4%
12.0%
March 2001
Credit Score
39.8
43.7
57.3
92.7
Source: Youguo Liang & Willard McIntosh, "Country Risk Premiums for International Investing" January 2000
Prudential Real Estate Investors; Institutional Investor March 2001 Credit Ratings.
Using the same formula and Institutional
changes in expected return reflect recent
climates in Brazil and Mexico.
Investor's updated credit scores from March 2001, the
instability in Argentina as well as improved investment
The market-based approach seems to be a less subjective attempt at quantifying the foreign risk
premium. However, as PREI points out, "implicit in the market approach is the assumption that
markets can correctly price country risks over the long term." Both the categorization-based
method and the market-based approach are susceptible to changes in the future.
As Lewis states, the arbitrary international risk premium should "inevitably decrease to nearer its
long-term appropriate resting place - at zero." While this is the case for investment between
core countries, the reality is that several of the groups that are currently targeting Latin America
are seeking higher returns on both an absolute level and a "risk-adjusted" level. Whether there
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Return
21.9%
20.8%
17.6%
12.0%
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exists an upswing in the real estate cycle or a lack of capital available locally, the foreign
investor in these markets is often lured by the opportunity to earn a return that is more than
ample for the risk assumed.
4.2 Risks for the Foreign Investor
Drilling a bit deeper into the risks that foreign investors build into their hurdle rates for each
country, the following are the components of risk that are specific to this region. As previously
mentioned, each country's risk profile is different, however, some of these risks are evident in all
three markets. One distinction that should be made when discussing risk in this region is the
difference between real and perceived risk. While the novice investor perceives a great many
risks in this region, upon further analysis some of them are more real than others.
4.2.1 Property Market Transparency
One of the most striking differences between most of these markets and those in the US is the
lack of "transparency". This refers to the quantity, quality and reliability of information made
available to participants in the marketplace. While perhaps this is due to the small size of these
markets or relative unsophistication, most of the principal markets in this region are perceived to
be quite opaque.
According to Jones Lang LaSalle's Transparency Ranking, there are five principal criteria of
transparent markets:39
1. Presence of public and private performance indices
2. Quality of market fundamentals research
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3. Availability of reliable financial statements
4. Alignment of interest between directors, managers and investors/shareholders
5. Taxes, penalties, restrictions on cross-boarder transactions.
JLL, in their Investment Strategy Annual 2001, places Argentina in the 5 th tier for "opaque" and
Brazil and Mexico in the 4th tier for "low transparency". Examples of tier 4 countries are
Poland, China and Italy. Tier 5 countries include Turkey, Greece and Chile.
Increasingly, international real estate brokerage and advisory companies are opening operations
in Latin America. With the addition of firms such as Cushman and Wakefield, CB Richard Ellis,
Colliers and Jones Lang LaSalle, periodic market reports are becoming available with
information on asking rents, vacancies and in some cases sale prices. However, due to the small,
fragmented markets, this information is still not as reliable as in markets such as the US and
Europe.
4.2.2 Real Estate Market Risk
An obvious factor for the foreign investor is the fundamental market risk. The discussion of this
risk can be broken down into two components: supply and demand.
On the supply side, with vacancy levels rising and an existing pipeline of development in place,
the obvious risk is an oversupply of space. For example, in Mexico City the office market is
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17.4% vacant as of 1 t quarter 2001, while reportedly there is 309,154 SM under construction,
representing 9% of the total market (3.4 million SM).4
On the demand side, real estate in Latin America is severely affected by general economic
recessions in each country. These economies endured limited recessions in 1998 and 1999 partly
due to the Asian Crisis and the Brazilian devaluation. 1999 was a difficult year for the office
markets. The devaluation in Brazil significantly affected foreign investors' returns in Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In Buenos Aires and Santiago office rents declined and will possibly
continue to do so in 2002, according to CB Richard Ellis' Market Index report, 1t quarter 2001.25
One positive feature that could mitigate the risk of oversupply is that property cycles in emerging
markets are likely to be shorter than those in developed markets if these markets continue their
high economic growth. According to a report by Torto-Wheaton Research, "demographic
patterns in Latin America suggest that the region must invest more in housing and other real
estate infrastructure simply to support a population that is growing faster than any other region in
the world".42
4.2.3 Financing Risk
Financing risk is a large obstacle for foreign investors in the region. Currently, affordable debt
financing is virtually non-existent for commercial projects in Argentina and Brazil. In Mexico,
debt financing is available with increasing competitiveness. (See "Financing and Secondary
Markets" section above for further details of financing options in the region).
41 CB Richard Ellis, Indice de Mercado, Mexico DF, 1° Trimestre 2001
42 Torto Wheaton Research, Growth Opportunities in Latin America, June 7 2000
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4.2.4 Ownership Structure Risk
Land ownership is extremely fractured in most urban areas in Latin America. Assembling large
sites to accommodate a modern office tower often requires years of land assembly.43 The result
is that there has been a consistent under supply of quality office space. As a counter result, many
cities have expanded into satellite centers (such as Sao Paulo and Mexico DF) if not constrained
by extreme centralization (such as Buenos Aires) or by natural conditions (i.e. Rio de Janeiro).
So, there are both risks of a lack of urban parcels and of the creation of alternative sub centers.
In addition to land, ownership of properties is also fragmented. Christopher Penn of Jones Lang
LaSalle in Brazil estimated that "at least 50% of downtown Sao Paulo is in stratified
ownership".44 Developments have been financed by selling one floor at a time to investors.
The end result is a building owned by multiple tenants, making retrofits or major capital
refurbishments nearly impossible. This process has in the past created huge losses for the
government in terms of the inefficiency of planning and installing a complete network of
services (transportation, drainage, power and water lines) in areas that only a few decades later
are abandoned by the best class office users. Sao Paulo's downtown clearly exemplifies this.
While selling floors, flats, or rooms is currently a lucrative exit for developers, it also makes
acquisition of existing assets a near impossible task to accomplish. The investor must aggregate
all fractions of the building and, as in the case with amassing parcels of land for development,
the investor is susceptible to being "held up" by the last owner.
43 Jones Lang Lasalle, Prospectus of Torre Norte, November 2000
44 Christopher Penn, Jones Lang Lasalle, June 2001 interview
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4.2.5 Leasing Risk
In Latin America the leasing risk varies from market to market (see Market Comparisons:
Leasing for details on leasing standards). In Argentina, lease laws govern the relationship
between the tenant and owner, as opposed to the "contract being king" like in the US. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the Ley de Alquileres represents a potentially great risk for
owners and investors.
The most commonly given counter-argument to the risk of early lease termination is that since
tenants pay all of the tenant improvements (TIs), they are less likely to cancel their leases. The
smaller the office space or level of TI required, the higher the probability of cancellation.
Additionally, as one player in the market noted, when tenants want out of a lease they can
usually find a way, even without this law.
Local sentiments on this law are somehow ambivalent. On one hand both local developers and
established international groups feel comfortable with this law. They know that they are
protected both on their leases, due to the high expenses of the TIs, and on their market share. In
fact, the argument can be made that they benefit from the fact that potential outside competitors
perceive the law as a greater risk than it really is.
However, as Francis Pons from CB Richard Ellis pointed out during the latest Americas Point
Meeting in Buenos Aires, this law should be abolished to allow a normal functioning of the
capital markets in real estate. Leases are not viewed as in the US, where they are often virtually
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traded as bonds in secondary markets. In Latin America when primary and secondary debt
markets emerge surely one of the first things lenders will request is to modify Article 8."
Furthermore, Pons said that the law is better justified for protecting residential tenants, rather
than commercial giants such as General Motors or Shell.4s
An additional risk is that lease terms are in general much shorter than in US. In Buenos Aires,
typically for multinational companies, leases for Class A office space are 3 to 5 years in length.
The more standardized the space, the shorter the lease period. In Brazil, office space is on
average leased around periods of 5 years. Even in Mexico, the "credit" deals in industrial sector
are not 20-year leases like in the US. Generally 10 years is the longest term, with average leases
at 3-7 years.
4.2.6 Political Risk
In addition to speculative and business risks, political risk is also a major source of concern for
investors. Traditional discussions of political risk in this region were usually related to the very
real threat of expropriation by military governments or civil hostility and strife. While social
unrest is still an issue today due to high levels of unemployment, the political risks that have the
most impact on real estate investment tend to relate to legislation and policy.
Given its immobility, real estate is most vulnerable to government expropriation, excessive taxes
or even arbitrary decisions affecting the future development of space. As a result, real estate
assets with significant exposures to these risks should carry appropriate risk premiums. For
example, recently in Mexico DF the newly elected mayor Mr. Lopez Obrador has unilaterally
45 Francis Pons, CB Richard Ellis, presentation at Americas Meeting Point, Buenos Aires, June 2001
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halted further development of office space in the submarket of Santa Fe.46 Usually these
measures are reversed after long periods of concealed negotiations, however they only serve to
exacerbate the sentiment of a lack of transparency of these markets.
Another example of the unpredictability of legislation is in this region is the case of Argentina's
value added tax (VAT). Historically this tax (21% of net profits less the deductible base) was
recoverable on the first sale of the property. It was excluded from both the land value and the
labor costs, bringing down the overall cost to approximately 16% of the total development cost.
This cost was offset with the sales VAT in the first title transfer. In the event that the building is
lined up for rent, this cost historically became part of the total cost because it could not be passed
on to the building's tenants. Only recently has the government decided to allow owners to pass
this cost on to rent. As a result, tenants are obliged to pay back the developer the 21% VAT tax.
While the ultimate impact of this measure is still not clear, it is an example of the today's type of
political risk in the region.
4.2.7 Currency
The risk of currency devaluation is a threat to the stability of dollar denominated returns. All of
these markets have had a history of volatile currencies. Although in Argentina and Mexico rents
can be dollars, in view of the policy changes in these markets, devaluation is always a risk. Real
estate remains linked to the overall economic situation. As one international real estate investor
says, "you make carton boxes because somebody makes shoes" and not the other way round.47
In Brazil this case is evident, which had the following recipe for disaster: dollar denominated
46 Ricardo Zuniga, Hines, Mexico DF, June 2001 interview
47 Lorenz Reibling, Taurus Investment Group, August 2001 interview
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foreigners made investments in real estate, with leases in Reais which devaluated severely in
1999.
The chart below exemplifies the consequence of such changes in the short-term horizon (i.e. a 1
year outlook).4 8
Figure 4.2: Effects of Devaluation: Nominal and Real
(Jan. '99 to June '00) Rent Transactions R$ per SM Rent Transactions US$ per SM
Property Jan 99 Jun 00 Nominal Jan 99 Jun 00 Real Loss in
Growth US$
Cenu Norte, Sao Paulo 50.00 67.80 35.60% 41.32 37.05 -11.05%
Birman 11 &12, Sao Paulo 27.79 38.09 37.06% 22.97 20.81 -10.34%
Caemi,Rio de Janeiro 47.00 65.00 38.30% 38.84 35.53 -9.36%
Mourisco, Rio de Janeiro 47.00 65.00 38.30% 38.84 35.52 -9.36%
Ave. Nominal Growth: 37.31% Ave. Real Loss in US$: -10.15%
Source: Javier Marquina, CB Richard Ellis, 2000
While currency devaluation was 35% between January 1999 and June 2000, the loss in US
dollars was only 10.15%, due to a combination of real rental growth and indexation of rents to
inflation (the GPI Index of Inflation was 21.2% for the same period). The view among the
foreign players who have stayed in Brazil is that sooner or later inflation catches up with
devaluation and investments recover. Nonetheless, for the short-horizon investor currency
represents a major risk.
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4.3 Strategies for Minimizing Risk
While there are many risks involved with an investment in this region, there are also a number of
mitigants for them. Historically, the options for mitigating risk in international investments have
included insurance from providers such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
This section presents a few of the strategies that investors in Latin American real estate employ
today:
4.3.1 Currency Hedging
Every foreign investor in these markets would like to neutralize exposure to currency
movements, especially the more risk-averse institution such as an insurance company or pension
fund. As noted above, the net return of a seemingly profitable real estate investment abroad can
be much lower or even negative when the effects of currency movements are factored in. In
theory, if the cash flows can be predicted accurately, hedging can effectively neutralize one's
exposure to currency fluctuations, net of transaction costs. The problem with derivatives,
however, is that there must be someone willing to take the other side of the bet. Currently in
Latin America (Argentina in particular), no one is willing make the market without a fee that
kills even the most lucrative deal.
The strategies for hedging currency risk typically involve one or more of the following options
(with definitions by JP Morgan Treasury Services49):
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48 Javier Marquina, Global Property Forum 2000, Washington DC
49 Andrew Best, "Hedging Asian Currency Risk" http://www.gtnews.com/articles2/1610.html
Outright currency forwards - Outright forwards are an agreement to exchange a specified
amount of one currency for another at a future date at a certain rate. The exchange of currencies
is priced to allow no risk-free arbitrage. Pricing is not a market estimate of the spot rate at that
date, but is made according to the two currencies' respective interest rates.
Currency swaps - Currency swaps involve the exchange of cash flows in one currency for those
in another. Cross-currency swaps often require an exchange of principal. The notional principal
may be exchanged at inception at the prevailing spot rate. Interest rate payments are swapped on
a fixed and/or floating basis. The principal is re-exchanged at maturity at the initial spot rate.
This re-exchange may enable hedgers to avoid translation losses, and show some translation
gains, if the exchange rate they are hedging weakens from the spot rate at which they hedge.
Principal-only swaps - A principal-only swap is a transaction designed to hedge the FX exposure
arising from foreign currency borrowings. It differs from a currency swap in that it hedges the
principal exposure only, and not the interim interest payments.
According to Johnson, Worzala, Lizieri and Kinnard, applying the above techniques is difficult
because "unlike bonds and equity markets, the market for real estate is illiquid and is subject to
high transaction, information and management costs."50 They also add that the longer holding
period adds uncertainly to cash flows, including the sale value, and makes exchange rates harder
to forecast. Also, the costs for hedging using traditional techniques are much greater since they
50 Richard Johnson, Elaine Worzala, Colin Lizieri, William Kinnard, "Mitigating Currency Risk for International
Hotel Investments: Can It Be Done?" Institutional Investor, Summer 2001
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are generally meant for short terms. It seems that investors have yet to find an even reasonable
insurance against devaluation in this region, let alone a "perfect hedge".
According to Francisco Bosch of the Peabody Group in Buenos Aires, "hedging does not exist
today. In the past you could do it at (a cost of) 3-10% per year, which was always cost
prohibitive. Alternatives to hedging are to level up in local money, structure rents in dollars, if
you can, or include escalations to make up for devaluation of the currency. ""
Bosch indicated that the cost of hedging was prohibitive in Brazil as well. Developers can,
however, index sale contracts to IGPM (Brazilian inflation) on a monthly basis (typically the
government only allows annual indexation). According to Luke Toft of Cargill in Sao Paulo,
"the theory is that inflation and devaluation should be the same - the longer the horizon the
closer the correlation between IGPM and devaluation. Since real estate projects have 3-5 year
horizons, a medium term, the hedge works - although it's not perfect."
It seems that IGPM would provide at least a partial hedge. However, as Toft points out, "if you
look at the last 12 months, devaluation has been 35% and IGPM has been 10% - over this short
period the hedge clearly has not worked. On the other hand, inflation is picking up and the Real
volatility has been heavily influenced by external factors. We would bet that the 25% spread
shrinks considerably over the next 12 months."
Prudential Real Estate Investors offers a somewhat comforting counter to the problem of
currency hedging. While the long-term holding period creates problems for hedging, it also
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lessens the effects of currency on the investment's returns. "The long-term volatility is most
relevant to the performance of real estate investments, and...currency effects rarely affect
investment performance over 8 year or longer periods of time."3 8 PREI acknowledges that
currency can have great short-term effects, but in the long run they "may only translate into
marginally higher long-term volatility for the portfolio and particularly for real estate
investments."
4.3.2 Joint Venturing and Entity Level Investment
Many foreign investors try to mitigate risk by partnering up with local real estate companies.
The rationale is the same as in the domestic model. Joint ventures are used extensively in real
estate "due to the matching benefits of capital, expertise and risk."52 Investors gain knowledge
and expertise from their local partners about the markets, processes, and laws. Local partners are
also a source of contacts and deals. Additionally, as many investors point out, these markets are
currently just thin to justify operating on a deal-by-deal basis. Investors need consistent deal
flow, hence the necessity to work with local groups.
Examples of joint venturing in Latin America range from traditional JVs like the case of
Peabody/G.Accion, AIG/Finsa, and Tishman/Metodo, to acquisitions of local companies like
Prudential/Icatu and Equity International/FVI. (see Recent Activity section).
In any partnership there is potential for conflicts of interest. For the construction of Torre Norte
in Sao Paulo, Tishman Speyer entered into a joint venture with the Brazilian construction
51 Francisco Bosch of JP Morgan/Peabody Group, June 2001 interview
52 David Marks, The Blackstone Group, Auguest 2001 interview
company, M6todo Engenharia S.A. The venture was publicized as a "strategic alliance" that
combined TSP's world-class development capabilities with M6todo's construction expertise and
familiarity with the market. The JV was a success in providing Tishman with local market
knowledge, but one could question the strategy given the conflicts of interest that are inherent
between builders and developers. The best international partnership probably is not necessarily
with a contractor or developer but rather one that brings both capital and local connections, yet
doesn't assume an inordinate amount of control.
This ideal of a local partner is hard to come by. As Rick Koenigsberger from Apollo Real Estate
Advisors puts it, "in Latin America the local groups that want you are often times the ones to
stay away from, while the ones you'd like to partner up with don't need you."53
Co-investment, while required by most capital partners in order to insure alignment of interests,
is not always feasible for the local partner. Cargill, for instance, originally partnered up with
RED, a very knowledgeable local consultant in Buenos Aires headed by Marcelo Alexander.
However, mostly due to large co-investment requirements, RED is no longer a JV partner of
Cargill and is currently focusing on advisory.
According to Bosch, when it comes to the issue of managing risk in this market, "players need to
accept that they're in an emerging market. If you start an investment memo by having to sell
your investors on Brazil, for example, then you won't get any deals done here."5
53 Rick Koenigsberger, Apollo Real Estate Advisors, July 2001 interview
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4.4 Investment Strategies and Recent Activity
This section first categorizes the main investment strategies that foreign investors are using in the
region. Within each category, examples of recent investment by the most prominent foreign
groups in the region are presented as well.
4.4.1 Investment Strategies
Latin America is considered a highly volatile emerging market. The situation in Argentina, plus
experiences with the Mexican and Brazilian devaluations still keep away the majority of
international real estate investment players. Particularly, the region is currently shunned by all
but a few of the better-known high yield funds. Several opportunistic investors, such as Apollo
Real Estate Advisors, Blackstone, and Soros Real Estate Investors, have recently raised funds
focused almost exclusively on Europe and Asia.
The foreign investment groups that are currently in the region are generally looking only at the
major metropolitan areas of Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Second-tier markets, which
have attracted some additional interest, include Venezuela, Peru and Costa Rica.
Building Platforms
Foreign investors are looking for investment opportunities in the region, with their focus varying
from direct acquisition of individual assets to joint ventures with regional players to participation
or take-over of existing companies with an established presence in the entire region. For the
latter categories, their investments in the region represent a vehicle for creating a regional
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operation or platform. The motivations for building a platform include exploiting regional
synergies and facilitating an eventual exit. As discussed further in Map of Investment Exits
section, the strategy is to build the regional operation up and make it attractive to potential
foreign institutional investors.
A crucial component to building a regional platform that will attract institutional investors is
what Roberto Ordorica from Prudential Real Estate Investors (PREI) calls a "champion". Due to
the lack of knowledge that the typical American investor has of these markets, there is a need for
one person or group to take the flag as the leader into the region. "Edward Siskind (of Goldman
Sachs' Whitehall Fund) or Tom McDonald (of Equity International) embody that type of
personality."54
Also characteristic of the platform model is investment at the entity level as opposed to single-
asset acquisitions or development. Both Prudential and Equity International are currently
following this model, injecting capital and creating autonomous entities in each country. PREI's
operations in Brazil started with the acquisition of Icatu, part of the construction conglomerate of
the Braga family in So Paulo. The new company, Prudential-Icatu Gestdo De Investimentos
Imobiliarios, is also forming Atlantica Residential to focus on the middle-income housing
market. These groups are participating in companies with local expertise and contacts, and
creating their own exit vehicle, either by selling the assets individually, selling the entire
company or taking it public through an initial public offering. Already this model was proven
successful by investors such as George Soros who participated in IRSA, which was subsequently
54 Roberto Ordorica, Prudential Real Estate Investors, Parsippany, July 2001,interview
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taken public. At a later stage Soros sold part of his participation back to IRSA and another part
to JP Morgan/Peabody Fund.
Equity International Properties, Sam Zell's privately held company which invests in real estate
companies and properties outside of the United States, is taking this model a step further. As
Senior VP Tom McDonald puts it, "we want to be a regional player with a platform that could
one day attract a foreign institution that is interested in participating in Latin American real
estate as region".62 Equity first set foot in the region in Argentina in 1997. Equity purchased a
70% interest in Dock del Plata from Comercial del Plata, the remaining 30% belonging to
Volkswagen. This investment also helped Equity International learn the rules of the region.
Equity International will pursue opportunistic investments along with funds from institutional
investors, who will expect 20%-plus leveraged returns. Their exit strategy, according to
McDonald, is to sell the assets or take them public within a 3 to 5-year window.62
Through the process Equity International came to realize that the same amount of time that
would be spent doing "one-off' acquisitions could be spent in purchasing an existing platform.
"The brain damage and the amount of micromanagement you are involved in are justifiable only
with the larger scale deals" according to McDonald. In December 1999 Equity International
entered the hotel market through a joint venture with Spanish operator NH Hoteles. Since the
investment, NH has expanded operations to Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Chile. In
July 2001 they have raised their participation in the company from $42.5 M to a $70M to expand
the Mexico operation from 1,400 to 2,800 total rooms.
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On the same idea Equity International formed Latinoamerican Office Properties (LOP). LOP has
started to amass a portfolio of office properties mainly through the partnership with Fondo de
Valores Inmobiliarios from Venezuela. Their intention is to build a portfolio through
partnerships with operators in Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico and Brasil. One of the exit
strategies is to find an institutional investor interested in buying out a real Latin American office
portfolio.
Equity International is also active in the industrial sector concentrating on industrial and
Maquiladora markets in Northern Mexico. They invested significant capital in Denver-based
Development Company of the Americas to form Corporate Properties of the Americas (CPA).
CPA (and the predecessor company) has acquired or developed over one million square feet of
industrial property in Mexico since 1997. The portfolio is tenanted by a diverse group of
leading multinational companies in markets such as Monterrey, Tijuana and Reynosa. Again the
strategy for Equity International is to eventually sell to an American investor or REIT involved
in industrial property.
"Exporting Expertise"
Another approach is the one used by international developers such as Hines or Tishman Speyer.
These groups strategically target the region and develop mainly on their own using other
people's money. Their competitive advantages are their knowledge in the development field and
their connections with large multinational tenants looking for class A space in emerging markets.
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In their latest investments (Hines' Northpark in Buenos Aires or Tishman's Rochavera in Sao
Paulo) these companies are investing equity from their investment funds. While they may or
may not have significant equity in these developments themselves, they are typically in these
deals for the fees generated by the projects.
In Argentina, after their initial go at the properties of Perez Companc Group, which finally ended
up in IRSA's hands, Tishman focused on Puerto Madero for the development of 78,000 SM of
Class A office space. According to Julian Villacorta of TSP Brazil, the project, Madero IV, is
currently on hold until the parties are able to find long-term financing. Currently they are in
talks with main commercial banks in Buenos Aires who are possibly interested in partnering up
for the development.
In Brazil, Tishman joint ventured with partner Metodo Engenharia, a local construction
company, to successfully develop Torre Norte. Funcef, the third largest Brazilian pension fund,
invested the bulk of the equity required. The project, which introduced new standards in office
space, was fully leased by March 2000 and today commands the highest rents in Sao Paulo for
Class A office space. Tishman entered the market with a fee contract and is now a recognized
player in the development of important mix use projects. Their second major development will
be the conversion of the CIBA site, a few miles down from Torre Norte, into a mixed-use two-
phase project totaling nearly 120,000 SM. In this project Tishman will be a direct equity
investor through their global investment partner, Travelers Insurance. Tishman has opted to
acquire additional local knowledge by bringing to the team Daniel Citron, previous head of
Brazil Realty-Cyrela.
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The Texas-based developer Hines, through their Emerging Market Fund, started construction of
Northpark, the company's first venture into Argentina. The project is a $35 million, 20,000 SM
office building outside of Buenos Aires's downtown, which is oriented to those companies
intending to stay close to the residential neighborhoods of Buenos Aires and yet well connected
through the north access to downtown. They are entering into the market at a time of low
expectations, and currently seem to be the only developer going forward with their project.
In Mexico, Hines partnered up with local group Promociones Metr6polis and created Del
Bosque, the premier office and residential development in the high-end Polanco district. In the
office market Hines developed Torre del Angel, consisting of the purchase of a distressed asset
brought through IPAB on a full equity basis. Hines also joined with two Mexican firms to build
the $50 million Parque Industrial. Recently the company was able to pull out equity through a
financing from GE Capital for nearly 50% of their Mexican portfolio.
In Brazil Hines has been in operation since 1997 following multinational companies as they fled
the distressed Russian and Asian markets for new ones like South America. Hines, in a joint
venture with Itacesa Emprendimentos, one of Brazil's largest developers, a $70 million
speculative office building of 40,000 SM, known as Panamericana Park. In another deal,
Dpaschoal, a tire distributor in Brazil, selected Hines to act as developer and manager of a new
project in Campinas, an area that has been targeted as the Silicon Valley of southeastern Brazil.
Hines developed and completed this project in 2001 and is also involved in numerous
international asset management, leasing and advisory assignments. As did Tishman, the
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company hired local expertise through Doug Munro as managing director of Hines Brazil,
formerly with the Sdo Paulo office of CB Richard Ellis.
Some might argue that the competitive advantage of these strategic players is the expertise that
they bring to the market from abroad. The counter argument would be that their true competitive
advantage is the capital they bring from abroad as well as their contacts with multi-national
tenants. Most likely, however, their contacts with these large tenants may be a result of the
expertise that they've shown with their domestic projects, and when these companies decide to
move into a new market they simply prefer to work with the same developer. The same might be
true with their investors, who are following them abroad as a result of successful investments at
home.
Niche Foreign Capital Opportunities
In markets that are capital constrained, many believe that by bringing capital from abroad an
investor can attain an arbitrage, or at least a higher risk-adjusted return, than they could at home.
This is a selling point for many foreign investors in these markets, including the strategic players
above. There are also a number of groups who are investing in the region with their own equity.
The Asset Investment & Finance Group of Cargill, the US-based agricultural company, takes this
approach to opportunistically target investments throughout the region. Cargill started this
strategy at home in the RTC days in the early 1990s. They have now exported this strategy to
foreign market. According to Ariel Turkie in Buenos Aires, Cargill is here simply because
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"there are opportunities in these market to buy assets out there that can be repositioned".55 They
are not trying to invent anything new, unlike perhaps the strategic players above. Rather, they
believe that their only competitive advantage is the cash that they bring. For example, In Brazil
and Argentina, Cargill is mimicking the local real estate games. Their exits are not through the
capital markets but through the pockets of the individual investors looking for the certainty of
real estate.
Cargill started their operations in Mexico after the financial crisis of 1994, trying to locate
portfolios of under-performing loans. They currently operate in Argentina under the name of
Andean Asset Management. Cargill already controls nearly $80 million of real estate assets in
Argentina. They started in 1997 by acquiring a 5-story property on the edge of the Catalinas
district which they repositioned in the market after a complete refurbishment, which included the
addition of 5 office floors and a new fagade. In 1999 they executed a sale/leaseback with Shell
for the acquisition of their headquarters in Buenos Aires.
The ability to finance their acquisitions with a multi-billion dollar balance sheet allowed them to
acquire from Birman a plot of land in the high end of Puerto Madero where they have started the
construction of the Riverview complex mimicking the success of Argentinean developers
creating high quality apartments. The entire development of high-end condominiums is being
presold in installments to individual wealthy individuals.
Cargill has opened an office in So Paulo as well where the pool of local capital is seemingly
much deeper. They formed a joint venture with Impar, a local construction company, who
55 Ariel Turkie, Andean Asset Management (Cargill), June 2001 interview
77
contributed the land to develop the Continental Square in Faria Lima, a mix-use development
with 2 hotels and office space totaling 120,000 square meters. Cargill entered the deal as the
equity partner. The entire development is being presold through the Fondos do Investimento
Imobilidrios (see Financing section above) to individual and institutional investors. Another
investment is the development of the complex Alto de Boa Vista, a high-end subdivision in the
outskirts of Sao Paulo.
Other Recent Investment
The above categories are not mutually exclusive. In many case, foreign investors operate in the
region under a combination of strategies. Listed below are some of these groups.
The insurance giant AIG has partnered up with Finsa as an equity investor and are now co-
holders of the biggest industrial portfolio in Latin America with more than 5 million square
meters throughout the region. Finsa is operating in 13 cities in Mexico, 1 in Texas y 1 in
Argentina. Once again armed with AIG's equity and a fixed line of credit for $250 million from
GE Capital, Finsa is looking to increase its presence in the industrial sector. They have an
aggressive acquisition plan geared toward adding a total of 7M square meters in the next three
years56.
The Peabody Group, a commingled fund with 10% participation from JP Morgan, 2% from J.W.
O'Connor & Co. and 88% from private investors, has originated two capital placements in Latin
America through their funds, Argo 1 ($400 million) and Argo 2 ($200 million). Argo 1 was
56 Karl Trieschman AIG Buenos Aires May 2001
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closed with the purchase of 5% of the shares in IRSA from George Soros at approximately $3
per share for a total of $27 million.
IRSA is one of the most important real estate companies in Argentina. The company participates
in the acquisition, development and operation of office, retail and hotels and in the development
and sale of housing complexes. The company possesses more than 85,000 SM of office space
(10% of the total Class A stock in Buenos Aires), 7 shopping centers, 3 hotels and 8.5 SM of
land. Additionally it has an international presence through Brazil Realty, a company that started
by mimicking the IRSA model in Brazil.
When Peabody made the IRSA investment they saw an opportunity to invest in the leading
Argentine real estate company at a discount to their net asset value. Since the purchase,
however, IRSA's stock has more than halved. In the year 2000, sales in their shopping center
portfolio fell 20% and income through development and sales fell 30%. Another problem
looming for IRSA is that 60% of its debt is maturing before March 2002, which could cause
considerable distress and further stock price reduction.57
The Peabody Group also made direct investments in Plaza Logistica, a 60,000 SM distribution
center just outside of Buenos Aires. Peabody has partnered up with two Argentinean groups,
Jorge Ader and the Bemberg Group, through their affiliate DASA for this project. Peabody is
actively looking into the Brazilian market trying to locate deals mainly through the acquisition of
properties that have to be disposed off the balance sheets of local pension funds
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Peabody has also invested directly in G. Accion S.A., a Mexican real estate company which
focuses on the US dollar-denominated industrial real estate market. According to John Rivard,
Principal of the Peabody Group, they have invested nearly $60 million in the company, which
holds nearly 4 million square feet of industrial property, the second largest portfolio in Mexico
after FINSA. The properties are diversified in Mexico with major concentrations in Juarez,
Guadalajuara, Tijuana, and Monterrey and Mexico City. By investing in a smaller company
(than IRSA in Argentina) Peabody retained more control, holding nearly 40% of the stock and a
seat on the company's Board of Directors.
The region has also seen the presence of the Goldman Sachs's Whitehall Fund. They have
participated, under the management of Ed Siskin, in the Mexican hotel market through their
acquisition of part of the stock of the Pamia. In Argentina and Brazil, Whitehall has invested in
the retail sector through their 6% share in APSA, the shopping center developer, and a 4.4%
participation in IRSA and in Multiplan, the largest developer of shopping centers in Brazil.
57 "El Presente de Irsa no es Color de Rosa", Apertura, June 29, 2001
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4.5 Opportunities for the Foreign Investor
While there are several sectors which represent potentially attractive investment opportunities,
such as housing or pre-selling of office space via private investors, this section outlines three of
the most interesting opportunities that are currently developing in the region.
Distressed Assets and Debt
Generally in this region, the lack of long term debt financing makes it difficult to find distressed
assets. Since properties are not marked to market on a regular basis by debt service payments,
owners still believe that property values remain constant. The result is large bid/ask spreads and
generally thin trading in the market. There are, however, a few opportunities in this category.
El Instituto Para la Protecci6n al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB) was created in the wake of Mexico's
mid-1990s Peso debacle to absorb nearly $70 billion in both Mexican bank loans that had gone
into default and bank-owned properties. IPAB is currently auctioning these pools of non-
performing loans as well as assets.
Several traditional real estate investment companies expressed disinterest in the IPAB portfolios,
citing that the assets were mostly not of institutional quality. On the other hand, as Jon
Grossman from Archon put it, "in the distressed debt game, there's no such thing as bad
portfolios, only bad prices". 58 Some of the groups that have bid on these pools include Brimco
(JE Robert & Deutsche Bank), Firstcity (Cargill), Amresco de Mexico, Archon/Goldman Sachs,
GE Capital, and Lonestar. On the asset side there have been some important auctions of assets
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such as the portfolio of the hotel chain Camino Real, which has recently been awarded to Casa
Diaz, through its subsidiary, Turistica Paraiso S.A. de C.V. Hines purchased the original Torre
del Angel building through an IPAB auction, refurbished and successfully repositioned it in the
market.
Dollarized Markets
For foreign investors that are averse to currency risk, the region does have some sectors that are
$-denominated. Perhaps the deepest asset class in the region is currently the industrial sector in
Northern Mexico. According to Gabriel Fernandez of AIG Global Investors, the sector is
booming in terms of investment thanks to the integration of the Mexican and US economies due
to NAFTA. It is one of the few sectors in the region that is experiencing asset trading.
Due to the development of this sector perhaps there are many unexploited complementary
functions. According to Antonio Elosua of U-Calli in Monterrey, the areas surrounding regional
airports could be ripe for warehouse development. Also, the recent relocation of businesses to
the sector has created a demand for other uses, such as offices, executive hotels, and housing.
Along the coast, President Fox has made quite clear his intention to favor the tourism industry in
order to attract more foreign investment. The government has started plans through what is
called the "Escalera Nautica", a plan to expand up the coast of Baja California.46
58 Jon Grossman, Archon Group, July 2001 interview
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In addition to the demand side there is increasing investor appetite in these sectors. With
dollarized leases and the availability of $-denominated debt, investors feel that the relatively
moderate returns adequately justify the risks.
Brazilian Pension Fund Assets
Pension fund investment in real estate has been a subject of controversy in Brazil. Pension funds
were the main investors in large real estate projects in Brazil during the 1990s. According to
Paulo Gomes of Prudential-Icatu, "real estate was often sold to Brazilian institutional investors at
high prices and was not expected to perform as well as other portions of the portfolio since fund
managers knew that prices were inflated from the beginning. In addition, corruption schemes
existed in some pension funds. Bribes were deducted from the purchase price, ultimately hurting
the fund's beneficiaries."59
According to Gomes, beginning in the late 1990s, regulatory agencies increasingly limited the
allocation of real estate in those institution's portfolio and now, in contrast to the "buy" mode of
the mid-1990s, pension funds are now involved on selling portions of their real estate
portfolios.59
Although there is a strong incentive to sell properties, there are still a number of obstacles. First,
the illiquidity of real estate is exacerbated in the case of pension funds that only hold large
participations. Secondly, the current managers of pension funds would have to mark down the
book value of poorly contracted investments and have little motivation to be penalized for past
managers' actions.
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Regardless of these obstacles, the real estate portfolios of Brazilian pension funds may represent
an attractive prospect for foreign investors. Brazil seems to be a market in full expansion. As
Francisco Bosch asserted, "for every deal in Argentina, people show you ten in Brazil".5
4.6 Investment "Exits"
As shown above, there are a number of attractive opportunities for the investor in this region.
However, the question most potential investors ask is not about "entrances" but rather "exits".
While investors can get into these deals at very attractive cap rates, the big question is whether
they will be able to exit at a lower one. The exits for the foreign investor in this region, in the
present and future, can be categorized as follows:
The General Public
The general public currently represents an attractive exit for developers of offices, apartments or
hotels. As mentioned in previous sections, the stratified ownership, which characterizes much of
the commercial stock in Argentina and Brazil, could be a result of the lack of debt financing that
necessitates pre-selling. Perhaps an even stronger force, however, is the cultural attitude toward
real estate ownership. While some developers pre-sell out of a lack of other financing
alternatives, the practice is favored by even the largest and best-capitalized real estate companies
in Argentina and Brazil.
According to Tomis Salles, Director of the Brazilian brokerage firm, Lopes Consultoria de
Im6veis, the "retail" market is currently by far the most lucrative exit for a developer in Brazil.
59 Paulo Gomes, "Brazilian Pension Funds: Real Estate Investments", MIT 2000
84
In May 2001, his firm liquidated all 780 units of the Holiday Inn Anhembi in a single day. The
"rooms" that are sold are really units of participation. In fact, purchasers of flats or rooms for
investment are forbidden by law to occupy them. The selling of rooms is "really just
marketing...Latin Americans love (to own) real estate." So, while foreign investors have IRR
hurdles of 30%+ to get comfortable, the general public is seen as being content with a return of
1% per month (or 12% annually).
Some market participants feel that this will soon change with the development of capital markets
in the region. As owners of real estate are forced to compare monthly net operating income to
monthly debt service obligations, real estate prices will become more linked with capital
markets. As prices are market-to-market on a more regular basis, the argument is that the spread
between the price that the general public and institutional investors' price will compress.
Domestic Pension Funds
In recent years there has not been great demand from domestic pension funds for real estate
assets. Only in Brazil have pension funds been big consumers of real estate in the last decade.
However, whether due to poor judgment or corrupt practices, many pension funds in Brazil have
real estate portfolios with market values that are significantly below book values. Recent
legislation has mandated that these pension funds reduce their position in real estate. A likely
result is that demand for real estate by pension funds will decrease even further.
However, proponents of securitization in these markets feel that pension funds represent great
potential for Latin American real estate. In order to match assets and liabilities in their
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portfolios, pension funds could invest in real estate asset-backed securities. For example,
Argentine pension funds purchased the majority of the units of participation from the
fideicomiso of La Nacion building in Buenos Aires in 1999. According to Adrian Dipliotti of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, who advised on the transaction, noted that there has been much interest
from pension funds for similar asset-backed commercial papers.60
Foreign Opportunists
The competitive landscape for opportunistic investors in this region currently varies from fund-
oriented groups, such as the Peabody Group or Equity International, to companies operating off
of large balance sheets such as Cargill (see Recent Activity section).
These groups, while opportunistically investing in deals themselves, do not represent an
attractive exit for investors. In order for these funds to venture into volatile markets such as
these, they're return expectations most likely start in the low 20's (percent).
While some of these groups could be considered "opportunity funds", the most familiar names
associated with that label, such as Soros, Blackstone, Whitehall or Apollo, are currently staying
clear of the region and are focusing on Europe and Asia. According to Rick Koenigsberger of
Apollo Real Estate Advisors, opportunity funds are "looking for IRRs that start with a 3".53
Without underwriting a very aggressive residual value, the way to boost returns to the 30% range
is to find cheap local leverage. Although absent in Argentina and Brazil, the debt market has
returned to Mexico. But even the existence of affordable debt and dollar-denominated leases has
yet to lure the opportunity funds to the country, including the active northern industrial sector.
60 Adrian Dipliotti, PricewaterhouseCooper, June 2001 interview
According to Renaud Haberkomrn of Soros Real Estate Investors, "Mexico's industrial real estate
is probably very correlated with the strength and the recovery of the US economy which we don't
believe into for the near term."61
Foreign Pension Funds & Money Managers
The majority of US pension funds and money managers have yet to enter the Latin American
real estate market. The perception of risk, in terms of political, currency, or property market
transparency, has been too great for risk-averse fiduciaries. In addition to economic and political
conditions keeping them away, institutions which are not taxed at home currently have to pay
taxes in Argentina and Brazil.
This is not to say that these groups are ignored altogether by the active players in the region. The
current wave of investors is optimistic that things will change. If Mexico can continue its recent
strength, and Argentina and Brazil can recover, foreign institutional capital will come. The
current strategies seem to be more about "first mover" advantage - building portfolios in
anticipation of this eventual stabilization.
According to some in the market, there has been more interest from European pension funds than
US ones. For German funds, such as Despa, yields in Latin America are very attractive. For
Spanish institutions, there are a number of cultural synergies. According to McDonald of Equity
International, "Spanish investors are less averse to the wild cycles of Latin America than their
US counterparts." 62 Julian Villacorta from Tishman Brazil repeated the same sentiment, adding
61 Renaud Haberkomrn, Soros Real Estate Investors, July 2001
62 Tom McDonald, Equity International, July 2001 interview
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that for the foreign investor there is an "education process involved, and it is different for EU and
US investors. Maybe the Germans and Spaniards will lead the way for the US investors."63
A leap of faith
Opportunistic investors seek out capital constrained markets where their cash has a competitive
advantage. But an illiquidity play will only pay off if capital subsequently returns to the market,
especially important for fund-oriented, time-sensitive investors. The big bet that current foreign
players are making is that these countries will improve and real estate will become attractive to
the broader foreign investor.
63 Julian Villacorta, TishmanSpeyer/Metodo, June 2001 interview
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5 CONCLUSION
Latin America represents a huge source of potential for foreign investors. The region has at
times seen large inflows of foreign investment and GDP growth. An especially powerful
influence has been the integration with US, especially in Mexico with NAFTA and the potential
of treaties integrating Chile, Brazil and possibly Argentina. The region's demographics, with a
young population, point to tremendous growth potential as well.
On other hand the region is no stranger to economic crises, with Mexico, Brazil and perhaps
currently Argentina, suffering similar problems in recent years. There is a seemingly ever-
present risk of default or currency devaluation in the eyes of the foreign investor. All of these
economies have passed through previous periods of high inflation and general economic
uncertainty.
While the risks are many for an investor, the region offers returns that are attractive. However,
in order for foreign investment to stay, these markets must be able to stabilize their economies,
offer affordable long-term debt financing, develop their secondary markets, and assuage foreign
investors of the lack of transparency.
There are many common themes in the region, however each market also has unique
characteristics with unique risk/return profiles. Mexico is currently the safest bet with a
booming industrial sector, availability of debt financing, and growing political stability. Brazil
may also be poised for tremendous growth, but is still grappling with inflation and currency
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devaluation. Argentina's outlook is uncertain. While there is still a deep and highly educated
base, the economic recession, high level of unemployment and inefficient political leadership
have cast doubts over the country's future.
The advantage of foreign investors is their ability to introduce liquidity to this capital constrained
region. The opportunity for these investors is to establish platforms in these markets before
economic maturity, foreign institutional appetite and asset market liquidity arrive. According to
Sam Zell of Equity International, "just like real estate is all about supply and demand, that
applies to real estate capital just as well. (Latin America) is capital short. And, therefore, in that
part of the world today, you can do transactions and you can get returns, and you can mollify
your risk to produce really positive results. Why? Cause they need us."64
64 Ernst & Young, "Transact '99: Where's The Smart Money Going Next?"
90
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Best, Andrew, "Hedging Asian Currency Risk," Global Treasury News (July 1999)
Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C. Principles of Corporate Finance. Massachusetts:
Irwing McGraw-Hill, 2000.
Cortabarria, Gonzalo. Industrial Real Estate Development in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2000
Costello, Jim, "Growth Opportunities in Latin America", Torto-Wheaton Research, June 2000
Gomes, Paulo. Brazilian Pension Funds: Real Estate Investments. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2000
Johnson, Richard, Worzala, Elaine, Lizieri, Colin, and Kinnard, William, "Mitigating Currency
Risk for International Hotel Investments: Can It Be Done?" Institutional Investor, Summer 2001.
Lewis, Ric, "Global Diversification of Real Estate Portfolios: At What Price Fear", Investment &
Pension Europe, April 2000.
Liang, Yougou, and Connor, Philip, and McIntosh, Willard, "Myths and Realities of
International Real Estate Investing", Prudential Real Estate Investors. November 1999
Liang, Yougou, and McIntosh, Willard, "Country Risk Premiums for International Investing",
Prudential Real Estate Investors. January 2000
Liang, Yougou, and McLemore, Richard, "Latin America 2001", Prudential Real Estate
Investors. March 2001
Riddiough, Timothy J., "Real Estate Capital Markets - Class Notes," Massachusetts Institute of
Technology - Center for Real Estate. Spring 2001.
Riddiough, Timothy J., "Real Estate Finance and Investments - Class Notes," Massachusetts
Institute of Technology - Center for Real Estate. Fall 2000.
Tora, Jose Ramon, "Latin American Securitization Markets Evolve Further in 2000", Standard
&Poors, January 2001
Vansetti, M. Celina R., Guarco, Philip, and Bauer, Gregory W., "The Fall of Bancomer and the
Future of the Indigenous Mega-Banks in Latin America," Moody's Investor Service, April 2000.
Wheaton, William C. and DiPasquale Denise. Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets. New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1996.
91
"As US Sneezes, Neighbors Fear a Cold - the Downturn up North Could Quash Recovery of
Latin Economies," Wall Street Journal, December 2000.
"Country Intelligence Report and Real Estate Market", CB Richard Ellis Latin American and
Caribbean Headquarters, October 2000
"Country Reports (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico)", Economist Intelligence Unit via ISI
Emerging Markets, Internet Securities, Inc., a Euromoney Institutional Investor company. 2001
"Indice de Mercado", CB Richard Ellis Mexico DF, 1o Trimestre 2001
"Investment Strategy Annual Report", LaSalle Investment Management, 2000
"La inversi6n extranjera en America Latina y el Caribe Informe 2000", Comisi6n Econ6mica
para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). April 2001
"Prospectus of Torre Norte", Jones Lang LaSalle, November 2000
Presentations
Citron, Daniel, "Brazil Realty Presentation at the Global Property Forum," Washington DC,
October 2000
Marquina, Javier, "CB Richard Ellis Presentation at the Global Property Forum," Washington
DC, October 2000
Pons, Francis "CB Richard Ellis Presentation at Americas Meeting Point," Buenos Aires, June
2001.
Internet Websites
http://www.eclac.org
http://www.mac.doc.gov/ola/mercosur
http://www.riobravo.com.br
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/nafta.html
http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta
http://www. ftaa-alca. org
http://www.excelsior.com.mx
http: //site. securities. com
http:/www.citypopulation.de
http://www.gecapitalrealestate.com.mx
http: //www. strategyresearch. com
http://www.cibrasec.com.br
http://www.brazilianmortgages.com.br
92
Interviewees & Contributors
Argentina
Shannon Robertson, Jones Lang LaSalle
Leo Zaietz, Jones Lang LaSalle
Francisco Bosch, The Peabody Group
Daniela Bullrich, IRSA
Ariel Turkie, Andean Asset Management
Gonzalo Cortabarria, Hines
Pablo Gutierrez, PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Adrian Diplotti, PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Nicolas Malumian, PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Karl H. Trieschman, AIG Global Real Estate
Leonardo Iacomoni, BBVA BancoFrances
Alejandro Bazet, CB Richard Ellis
Luis Donaldson, CB Richard Ellis
Andres Filger, Currie & Brown
Jorge Fernandez Prieto, Conenar
Marcelo Alexander, RED
Brazil
Christopher Penn, Jones Lang LaSalle
Eoin Slavin, Jones Lang LaSalle
Cristina Vieira, JonesLangLaSalle
Julian Villacorta, Tishman Speyer
Ana Paula Aguiar, Tishman Speyer
Fernando Bergamin, Brazil Realty
Francisco Andragnes, Prudential
Pablo Gomes, Prudential Icatu
Douglas Munro, Hines
Luke Toft, Cargill
Renato Ventura, Unibanco
Fabio Noguera, Brazilian Mortgages
Eduardo Machado, Rio Bravo Consultoria Financeira Ltda
Antonio Rego, Associacao Philips de Seguridade Social
Fernnardus Manuel de Rooij, Associacao Philips de Seguridade Social
Tomas Salles, Lopes Consultoria de Imoveis
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Mexico
Hector Klerian, Jones Lang LaSalle
Manuel Rivera Torres, Jones Lang LaSalle
Javier Llaca, Jones Lang LaSalle
Hector Romeu, FINSA
Raul Gallegos, GE Capital
Jaime Lara, GE Capital
Joaquin DeMonet, GE Capital
Gonzalo Maldonado, Dine
Vladimir Ramirez, Heller Financial
Ricardo Zuniga, Hines
Jose Camargo, Scotiabank Inverlat
Jon Grossman, Archon Group
Antonio Elosua Muguerza, U-Calli
USA
Jacques Gordon, LaSalle Investment Management
Laura Schwartz, Merrill Lynch
Milton Chacon, Moody's Investor Service
Mia Koo, Fitch IBCA
David Martinez, Starwood Hotels
Liza Him, CB Richard Ellis
Gabriel Fernandez, AIG Global Real Estate
Jon Turner, Regus
Jonathan Langer, Goldman Sachs/Whitehall Fund
Ken Moskow, American Venture Corp
Lorenz Reibling, Taurus Investment Group
Renaud Haberkorn, Soros Real Estate Investors
Tom McDonald, Equity International
Roberto Ordorica, PREI
Mike Carp, GIC Real Estate
John Rivard, Peabody Group
Thomas Farrell, TishmanSpeyer
Rick Koenigsberger, Apollo Real Estate Advisors
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